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INTRODUCTION

T

he Indian Constitution contains “Directive Principles of
State Policy”1 that require the state to pursue socioeconomic justice.2 These principles are explicitly nonjusticiable
under the Constitution.3 However, the Indian Supreme Court
(“Supreme Court” or “Court”) has interpreted the right to life
under Article 21 of the Constitution to protect a right to “live
with dignity.”4 It has since held that directive principles pertaining, inter alia, to food, shelter, and a decent livelihood are
essential to human dignity and are therefore judicially enforceable rights.5
Much scholarship has been devoted to the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence in this area, focusing mostly on the judiciary’s
role in a constitutional democracy. These works either criticize

* Assistant Professor and Executive Director of Centre for Public Interest
Law, Jindal Global Law School, National Capital Region of Delhi, India. J.D.
(Harvard), A.B. (Brown). I am very grateful to Professor Frank Michelman,
whose class on Rawls & Constitutionalism inspired this paper, and whose
insightful comments on an earlier draft benefitted me greatly. I am also indebted to many colleagues and friends who offered helpful comments, including Jonathan Gingerich, Dipika Jain, Rajeev Kadambi, Shivprasad Swaminathan, and Ashwini Vasanthakumar. Finally, I thank Nisha Raman for excellent research assistance and the editors of the Brooklyn Journal of International Law for their thoughtful and thorough edits.
1. Directive principles include, inter alia, working toward providing free
education and improving nutritional standards. See INDIA CONST. arts. 36–51.
2. “Socioeconomic justice” broadly refers to what Professor Michelman
describes as “social rights” or policies aimed at the “satisfaction of certain
material needs or wants, or access to the means of satisfaction.” Such rights
or policies include the provision or access to a minimum adequate standard of
living, food, and shelter. See generally Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution,
Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, in EXPLORING SOCIAL
RIGHTS: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 21–24 (Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal
M. Gross eds., 2007).
3. See INDIA CONST. art. 37 (stating that directive principles “shall not be
enforceable by any court”).
4. See Mullin v. Adm’r, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516, 518
(India).
5. A “right” refers to a constitutionally recognized, judicially enforceable
restraint on popular government. See generally Mahendra P. Singh, Constitutionalization and Realization of Human Rights in India, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
JUSTICE & CONSTITUTIONAL EMPOWERMENT (C. Raj Kumar & K. Chockalingam
eds., 2007).
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the Court for “judicial activism” or applaud it for proactively
defending the rights of the poor and marginalized.6
This Article analyzes socioeconomic rights in India from a
Rawlsian perspective, which illuminates a neglected aspect of
this debate. While addressing concerns of judicial overreach, I
argue that the Supreme Court’s reasoning for locating justiciable socioeconomic rights in the Indian Constitution raises a
more fundamental concern: it threatens the Constitution’s legitimacy.
The Article has five parts. Part I sets forth the theoretical
framework, which is grounded in John Rawls’s liberal principle
of legitimacy. This principle states that political power is justified only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution
that all citizens would accept assuming they are rationally selfinterested and reasonable.7 It then discusses Professor Frank
Michelman’s recent work, which draws on Rawlsian theory to
examine what makes a constitution legitimate in a liberal
state.
In The Constitution, Social Rights and Liberal Political Justification, Michelman questions the wisdom of conferring constitutional status on socioeconomic rights.8 He makes a positive
case for including socioeconomic rights in a constitution, which
must overcome two major objections.9 The first is a “democratic
objection,” where broad “social citizenship rights” would leave
“no leading issue . . . untouched” in the political sphere.10 Imag6. Compare Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty, 18 J.
DEMOCRACY 70 (2007) and Raju Ramachandran, The Supreme Court and the
Basic Structure Doctrine, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE 107 (B.N. Kirpal et
al. eds., 2000) (criticizing the Indian Supreme Court’s excessive use of judicial
review) with Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India, 4 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 107 (1985)
(commending the Court for becoming a more populist “Supreme Court for
Indians”) and Vijayashri Sripati, Human Rights in India—Fifty Years after
Independence, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 93, 136 (1997) (defending the
Court’s “activism” for recognizing an “impressive array of Fundamental
Rights”).
7. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 28; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 217 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
8. See Michelman, supra note 2. While Michelman uses the term “social
rights,” this paper refers to the same set of rights as “socioeconomic rights” to
convey a broader understanding of their scope and impact.
9. Id. at 23–24.
10. Id. at 30–33.
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ine a constitution that includes enforceable rights to housing,
food, and clean water. Such a constitution would constrain policy choices in any area involving the allocation and distribution
of resources, including taxation, trade, immigration, and education. In extreme cases, representative democracy would be
rendered meaningless, as elected representatives would not be
able to make “the most basic choices of political economy.”11
Conferring constitutional status on socioeconomic rights also
invites a “contractarian objection.”12 Social contractarians believe that a constitution is legitimate if rational citizens, acting
reasonably, can understand its terms and agree to be governed
by them.13 To accept a constitution’s terms, citizens must be
able to determine whether their government actually abides by
constitutional principles. If they cannot make this determination, they may not regard the constitution as a legitimate “basis for political rule.”14
However, it is difficult to gauge if a government fulfills socioeconomic rights. Take, for instance, the right to adequate housing. What if the government provides free housing to 90% of
those living in poverty? Does it therefore “violate” this right
vis-à-vis the remaining 10%? Because socioeconomic rights require positive action by the government, including the provision of entitlements, the extent to which the government “complies” with these rights depends on an individual citizen’s
views of distributive justice. This sort of indeterminacy is potentially fatal for contractarian legitimacy, as citizens cannot
determine when their government violates socioeconomic
rights.15 Rawls avoids this difficulty by defining a legitimate
constitutional scheme as one that includes certain constitutionally essential civil and political rights.16 Judicial and policy
decisions with respect to socioeconomic rights are held to a
lesser standard—what Rawls referred to as the “constraint of
public reason.”17
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
2001)

Id. at 33.
Id. at 35–37.
Id. at 35.
See id. at 36.
See id. at 36.
Id. at 38.
JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 90 (Erin Kelly ed.,
[hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS]; RAWLS, POLITICAL
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Part II describes the drafting and enactment of the Indian
Constitution. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, which is silent on
the issue of socioeconomic justice, or the South African Constitution, which enumerates justiciable socioeconomic rights,18
India’s Constitution takes a middle ground. It does not contain
enforceable socioeconomic rights, but includes instead “Directive Principles of State Policy.”19 The framers of the Indian
Constitution placed fundamental rights and directive principles in Part III and Part IV of the Constitution, respectively.20
They empowered the Supreme Court to enforce fundamental
rights through Article 32,21 but specified in Article 37 that directive principles are not justiciable.22 Nevertheless, these
principles “give a certain inflection to political public reason” to
guide legislators toward the progressive realization of socioeconomic justice.23
Giving socioeconomic guarantees this nonjusticiable status
should have avoided both the democratic and contractarian objections. When directive principles do not legally bind elected
officials, but guide them toward improving socioeconomic conditions, then no serious democratic objection arises. And, if representatives make policy decisions reflecting their honest
judgment of how to best pursue socioeconomic justice and they
are willing to fully and transparently explain their votes to citizens—that is, they fulfill the constraint of public reason—then

LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 214–17 (explaining that public reason requires
citizens [including elected representatives and judges] to present publicly
acceptable reasons to each other for their views, at least with regard to basic
justice [which includes socioeconomic justice] and constitutional essentials.
Citizens must also be willing to “listen to others” and display “fairmindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made”).
18. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 26, 27.
19. See INDIA CONST. arts. 38–47.
20. See INDIA CONST. arts. 12–51. See also GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN
CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION 50–83 (1966) [hereinafter AUSTIN,
THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION].
21. See INDIA CONST. art. 32 (guaranteeing the right of individual citizens
“to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement
of [fundamental] . . . rights”).
22. Id. art. 37.
23. Michelman, supra note 2, at 39.
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the contractarian objection does not arise.24 In practice, though,
India’s constitutional experience has given rise to both objections.
Part III surveys the evolving constitutional status of socioeconomic rights. Over the past forty years, the Indian Supreme
Court has moved away from its early precedents and understanding of the Indian Constitution. It has ruled that the Constitution confers on citizens enforceable socioeconomic rights
that, if violated, can be redressed in court. Under this prevailing interpretation, India faces serious democratic and contractarian objections to its basic constitutional framework.
Part IV discusses the democratic objection in light of the Indian Supreme Court rulings on socioeconomic rights. The Court
has required both central and state governments to adopt specific distributive policies.25 These include giving mid-day meals
to schoolchildren, improving the public food supply distribution
system, and providing shelter, food, and sanitation to the
homeless.26
This robust exercise of judicial review prevents elected officials from deliberating, negotiating, and crafting policies concerning socioeconomic justice. The Court does not simply declare socioeconomic policies unconstitutional, but creates and
enforces its own policy solutions.27 In several cases, the Court
has essentially dictated policies to elected officials that allocate
resources to assist disadvantaged communities. It has even instituted timelines for the completion of these policies, which it
enforces through interim orders.28 This sort of policymaking is
precisely what the democratic objection opposes, as it appears
to seriously undermine representative democracy.
For Rawls, however, a robust form of judicial review might be
acceptable in some societies. He stated that judicial review “can
24. Id. at 37–38; see also RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at
89–94.
25. See, e.g., PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001)
(India).
26. See Lauren Birchfield & Jessica Corsi, Between Starvation and Globalization: Realizing the Right to Food in India, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 691, 694,
700 (2010); Singh, supra note 5, at 35.
27. See, e.g., Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67 (India).
28. See id.; PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001)
(India).
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perhaps be defended given certain historical circumstances and
conditions of political culture.”29 India is beset with such chronic inequality, poverty, and malnourishment that its elected
representatives have been unable or unwilling to improve,30
leaving the Supreme Court to remedy these conditions. In other
words, justice might require the Court’s intrusion into matters
usually assigned to the elected branches given these political
and historical circumstances.
Part V addresses the contractarian objection to justiciable socioeconomic rights in India. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution states, “No person shall be deprived of his life . . . except
according to procedure established by law.”31 The Indian Supreme Court has held that socioeconomic guarantees are judicially enforceable by interpreting this provision to encompass a
broader right to “live with dignity.”32 It has since held that
rights to adequate food, education, and shelter, inter alia, are
essential for citizens to live with dignity and are justiciable under Art. 21.33
Through this capacious reading of Article 21, the Indian Supreme Court has essentially shoehorned socioeconomic guarantees into a “constitutionally essential” civil right. This judicial
sleight of hand makes the right to life indeterminate under the
Indian Constitution, as a right to “live with dignity” could extend to a range of guarantees that rational citizens could not
reasonably foresee and therefore could not endorse. More troublingly, the Court does not explain how it gets past the clear
textual command in Article 37 of the Constitution, which plainly states that directive principles “shall not be enforceable by
any court.”34

29. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 240.
30. See, e.g., Jean Dreze, Democracy and the Right to Food, 39 ECON. &
POL. WKLY. 1723 (2004).
31. INDIA CONST. art. 21.
32. See Mullin v. Adm’r, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516, 529
(India).
33. See PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India); Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 S.C.R. 594, 700–01 (India); Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., (1985) 2 S.C.R. Supp. 51, 83 (India).
34. INDIA CONST. art. 37.
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Rawls called the Supreme Court the “exemplar of public reason”35 to convey that it has a greater obligation than other
branches of government to justify its decisions with transparent and clearly articulated reasons that are acceptable to all
rational and reasonable citizens. When it fails to set forth such
reasons, as with its expansive interpretation of Article 21, citizens might not assent to be governed by the Constitution, as
they could not know with any clarity or certainty what this
constitutionally essential right requires and therefore could not
determine if it is being met.
The Article concludes by highlighting some analytical insights into Indian Constitutional law that emerge from its theoretical framework. It also suggests that a legitimate constitutional system requires more than acceptable institutional arrangements that allow for desirable political outcomes—it demands honesty and clarity in the reasoning employed by public
institutions on matters of basic justice and constitutional essentials.
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Justice as Fairness
This Article is grounded in John Rawls’s theory of justice as
fairness that he articulated in A THEORY OF JUSTICE and refined in his later work.36 Justice as fairness rests on three basic
premises. First, it is framed for a democratic society—a society
that has a “fair system of social cooperation between citizens
regarded as free and equal.”37 Here, Rawls adopts a “thick”
conception of democracy, beyond mere majoritarian democracy.
He describes the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation that has at least three essential features: (1) social cooperation is guided by publicly recognized rules and procedures, and not simply socially coordinated activity; (2) social
cooperation involves fair terms of cooperation that each participant should accept, provided everyone else accepts them, and
includes an idea of reciprocity wherein participants that follow
35. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 231.
36. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999); RAWLS,
JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17.
37. See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 39.
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the established rules benefit in a manner specified by a public
and agreed-upon standard; (3) social “cooperation also includes
the idea of each participant’s rational advantage, or good. The
idea of rational advantage specifies what it is that those engaged in cooperation are seeking to advance” in terms of their
own good.38 By “free and equal persons,” Rawls means, “in virtue of their two moral powers (a capacity for a sense of justice
and for a conception of the good) and the powers of reason (of
judgment, thought, and inference connected with these powers), persons are free.”39 He assumes here that citizens have
“these powers to the requisite minimum degree to be fully cooperating members of society,” which makes them equal.40
A second premise of justice as fairness is that it considers the
basic structure of society as the “primary subject of political
justice.”41 In other words, it focuses on political and social institutions and “how they fit into one unified system of cooperation.”42 These institutions include the political constitution, independent judiciary, economic institutions such as competitive
markets, and the family.43 The basic structure, then, “is the
background social framework” within which all of society’s individual and collective activities take place.44
The third premise is that justice as fairness is a form of political liberalism that aims to justify the coercion of the state over
free and equal citizens in society.45 This is a difficult task because of the “fact of reasonable pluralism”—the fact that citizens in any democratic society hold a diverse range of reasonable, comprehensive doctrines.46 Rawls asks, if reasonable pluralism always exists, and political power in a democracy is the
collective power of free and equal citizens, on what basis can
citizens (through their elected representatives) legitimately exercise coercive power over their fellow citizens?47
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 6.
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 18–19.
Id. at 19.
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 10.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 10.
Id.
See generally id. at 18–24, 40.
Id. See also RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 58–66.
See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 40–41.
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The answer for Rawls is the liberal principle of legitimacy.48
The principle holds that “political power is legitimate only
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution (written
or unwritten) the essentials of which all citizens, as reasonable
and rational, can endorse in light of their common human reason.”49 In determining what these “constitutional essentials”
might be, and in addressing questions of basic justice, Rawls
argues that we should only appeal to principles that all citizens
could rationally and reasonably endorse.50
Rawls set forth an elaborate thought experiment to deduce
these principles. He begins with the “original position,” where
representatives of a society convene to decide upon its basic
constitutional structure. These representatives are normal cooperating members of society who, despite differences in ability
and socioeconomic standing, are free and equal in their ability
to exercise their two moral powers to at least the requisite minimum degree.51 Representatives negotiate the basic structure
behind a “veil of ignorance [where they] . . . are not allowed to
know” their social positions or the comprehensive doctrines of
the individuals they represent.52 The “veil” also prevents representatives from knowing their constituents’ sex, race, ethnic
group, strength, intelligence, and other “native endowments.”53
When choosing which principles to adopt, representatives are
limited to the same body of general facts and the same information about the “general circumstances of society.”54 Under
these constraints, representatives deliberate from an equal position and under fair terms of social cooperation to agree on

48. See id. at 41.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 41, 6–7 (“[R]easonable persons are ready to propose, or to
acknowledge when proposed by others, the principles needed to specify what
can be seen by all as fair terms of cooperation. Reasonable persons also understand that they are to honor these principles, even at the expense of their
own interests.”) (emphasis added); id. at 7 (“[I]t may be that some have a superior political power or are placed in more fortunate circumstances . . . it
may be rational for those so placed to take advantage of their situation . . .
but unreasonable all the same.”) (emphasis added).
51. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 22–28.
52. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 15.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 86–87.
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principles of political justice for the basic structure—put otherwise, justice as fairness.55
What emanates from the original position is one of Rawls’s
most seminal contributions: the two principles of justice that
specify basic rights and liberties and regulate economic and
social inequalities in the basic structure.56 The first principle
holds that “[e]ach person has the same indefeasible claim to a
fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is
compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all.”57 For
Rawls, the first principle is constitutionally essential,58 meaning that the liberal principle of legitimacy cannot be satisfied if
a society’s basic law—its Constitution—does not meet the criteria of the first principle.
The first principle of justice requires that democratic societies put in place a basic set of fundamental rights available to
all citizens. These rights include the “freedom of thought and
liberty of conscience[,] political liberties” (such as the right to
vote), freedom of association, rights and liberties associated
with the integrity of the person, and the rights and liberties
specified by the rule of law.59 It also includes a “social minimum” to be provided to all citizens.60 This list is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. Rawls merely specifies a minimal set of
fundamental rights with which any just society must abide, but
leaves it to individual societies to work out the specific contours
of those rights. Imagine, for instance, two democratic societies
that constitutionally protect the right to free speech, but the
first prohibits hate speech, while the second does not. The
scope of this fundamental right is therefore broader in the second society than the first. Still, the restriction on free speech in

55. Id. at 16, 87.
56. Id. at 41–42.
57. Id. at 42.
58. Id. at 46.
59. Id. at 44.
60. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 166, 228–29 (noting
that it is constitutionally essential for the state to provide a “social minimum”
providing for satisfaction of citizens’ “basic” material needs to the extent required to enable them to take effective part in political and social life).
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the first society is reasonable and does not necessarily violate
the first principle.61
The second principle of justice requires that “[s]ocial and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are
to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.”62 The first clause requires formal equality—that is, there
should be no discrimination in the selection process for public
offices and social positions. It also requires that all citizens
have a “fair chance” to attain these offices or positions.63 The
second clause, commonly referred to as the “difference principle,” essentially imposes a distributive policy on society. When
tackling social and economic inequality, this principle requires
society to distribute resources to the greatest benefit of its least
privileged members.64
Crucially, for the purposes of this Article, Rawls does not
consider the second principle of justice—which concerns socioeconomic justice—constitutionally essential.65 He specified that
the first principle is prior to the second not only in his taxonomy, but also in terms of importance and application.66 The second principle is only to be implemented within a setting of
background institutions created by a constitution, whose essentials are set out in the first principle.67 Therefore, the first
principle must be fully satisfied before the application of the
second principle.68
The two principles are also to be applied at different stages of
a society’s development. The first principle applies “at the stage
of the constitutional convention,” as it is “more urgent” to settle
61. See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1597 (2010) (noting that democratic states such as
England, Canada, France, Denmark, Germany, and New Zealand all prohibit
hate speech, while the United States does not; and, drawing on Rawlsian theory, arguing that hate speech regulation is compatible with democratic legitimacy).
62. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 42–43.
63. Id. at 43.
64. Id. at 52.
65. See id. at 46.
66. See id. at 43, 46–47.
67. Id. at 46.
68. Id. at 46–47.
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constitutional essentials than to determine policies of economic
and social justice.69 In contrast, the second principle applies “at
the legislative stage and it bears on all kinds of social and economic legislation, and on the many kinds of issues arising at
this point.”70 This lag in the application of the second principle
stems not only from Rawls’s view that the constitutional essentials of the first principle are more important than the distributive justice required by the second principle, but also from his
belief that “[i]t is far easier to tell whether . . . [constitutional]
essentials are realized.”71 He noted a crucial difference between
the principles is that while “it seems possible to gain agreement on what . . . [constitutional] essentials should be,” the realization of the second principle is “always open to reasonable
differences of opinion . . . [it] depend[s] on inference and judgment in assessing complex social and economic information.”72
Here, Rawls seems to have anticipated the contractarian objection to placing economic and social rights within a constitution.73 Recognizing that rational citizens, acting reasonably,
will likely disagree on the appropriate allocation and distribution of resources, Rawls defers decisions of socioeconomic justice to the legislative process.74 At that point, a society’s basic
constitutional structure is in place, including a political framework that can effectively tackle these complex, informationdriven policy questions.

69. Id. at 48–49.
70. Id. at 48.
71. Id. at 49.
72. Id. at 48–49. See also Frank I. Michelman, Poverty in Liberalism: A
Comment on the Constitutional Essentials, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1001, 1016–19
(2012) [hereinafter Michelman, Poverty in Liberalism] (noting that the
placement of socioeconomic justice within the second principle does not degrade its importance but rather leaves it to a more suitable process).
73. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 23.
74. See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 48.
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B. The Constraint of Public Reason
1. A Shift in Rawlsian Thought
In his later writings, John Rawls moved away from the comprehensive doctrine he set out in A THEORY OF JUSTICE.75 A
THEORY OF JUSTICE sought to improve on the work of social
contractarians like Kant and Rousseau to create a superior
theory to the “dominant tradition of utilitarianism.”76 To that
end, it promulgated the “theory of justice as fairness as a comprehensive doctrine.”77 Recognizing the fact of reasonable pluralism—that citizens in any democratic society hold a diverse
range of comprehensive doctrines—Rawls’s later work regards
a society adhering to a single comprehensive doctrine as impossible to create.78 Rawls therefore introduces the idea of “overlapping consensus” to formulate a more realistic, well-ordered
society.79 This concept reconciles the fact of reasonable pluralism with Rawls’s view that all citizens must agree on the same
political conception of justice to have a well-ordered society.
Since citizens will not be able to agree on a single comprehensive view, citizens should instead aim for a reasonable overlapping consensus of this political conception despite conflicting
moral, religious, and philosophical views within a society.80 In
other words, the political conception of justice as fairness can
be a “shared point of view” even though citizens do not affirm it
for the same reasons.81
In this pluralistic society, there must be reasonable grounds
for communication among citizens with different (and sometimes conflicting) reasons for endorsing justice as fairness as a
political conception of justice. In particular, there must be
agreement on the guidelines of public inquiry and on the criteria as to what information and knowledge is relevant in dis-

75. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES WITH “THE IDEA OF PUBLIC
REASON REVISITED” 179–80 (2001).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7.
79. See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 32. See also RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 133–72.
80. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 32.
81. Id.
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cussing questions of basic justice and constitutional essentials.82
Enter the constraint of public reason—it is the means
through which societies faced with reasonable pluralism can
conform to the liberal principle of legitimacy. Since each citizen
has an equal share of political power, that power should be exercised in ways that all citizens can publicly endorse in light of
their own reason.83 Public reason therefore requires that citizens present publicly acceptable reasons to each other for their
political views, at least with regard to basic justice and constitutional essentials.84 Citizens must also be willing to “listen to
others” and display “fair-mindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made.”85
Public reason extends to all public discourse pertaining to
basic justice and constitutional essentials, but not to other political questions.86 It also does not constrain personal deliberations about political questions or the discussion of such questions within associations such as churches and universities.87
As for its subjects, public reason applies to the public acts, pronouncements, and deliberations of elected officials, the decision
making of judges, and to political discourse among ordinary
citizens when, for instance, they exercise their right to vote or
engage in public advocacy.88
Rawls did not precisely specify the content of public reason.
He stated that it includes “general beliefs and reasoning found
in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science,
when not controversial.”89 He added that while comprehensive
religious and philosophical doctrines can be introduced and
discussed so that citizens better understand each other’s views,
these doctrines are not public reasons and therefore cannot
82. See id. at 89; RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 214.
83. See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 90–91.
84. See id. at 90. See also Bruce Ackerman, Political Liberalisms, 91 J.
PHIL. 364, 366 (1994) (referring to Rawls’s conception of public reason as representing one of the “most important breaks” from Rawls’s earlier work and
exhibiting an “overriding commitment to public dialogue”).
85. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 217.
86. Id. at 214.
87. Id. at 215.
88. See id. 213–16.
89. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 90.
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form the basis for public discourse on matters of basic justice
and constitutional essentials.90 Citizens (including elected representatives and judges) must instead advocate for the laws
and public polices they favor using general knowledge and
ways of reasoning that all other citizens can access using their
common powers of reason.91
2. Public Reason and the Supreme Court
Among the various institutions in a well-ordered democratic
society, Rawls singled out the Supreme Court to play a “special
role” in the application of public reason.92 He noted that a constitutional democracy is dualist in nature: it contains both ordinary (legislative) and higher (constitutional) law.93 Because
the Supreme Court is the final arbiter on questions of constitutional law, it plays an important role in preventing erosion in
this higher law by “transient majorities or . . . by organized and
well-situated narrow interests skilled at getting their way.”94
The Court therefore acts as an anti-majoritarian institution
toward ordinary law or legislation. Yet, as Rawls made clear, it
is not anti-majoritarian with regard to the higher, constitutional law. More specifically, when its decisions reasonably fit
with the text of the Constitution, constitutional precedents and
political understandings of the Constitution, the Court is not
anti-majoritarian.95 Thus, Supreme Court justices must employ
public reasons to explain and justify their decisions to a greater
extent than society expects from legislative and executive officials.96
Rawls referred to the Supreme Court as the “exemplar of
public reason” because the Court may not employ any other
sort of reason in discharging its constitutional duty.97 While
ordinary citizens and elected representatives confront all sorts
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 216.
93. See id. at 233; See also Frank I. Michelman, Justice as Fairness, Legitimacy and the Question of Judicial Review: A Comment, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
1407, 1408 (2004) [hereinafter Michelman, Justice as Fairness].
94. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 233.
95. Id. at 234, 236.
96. See id. at 216.
97. Id. at 216, 235.
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of political questions that do not concern basic justice and constitutional essentials—and therefore do not fall under the constraint of public reason—Supreme Court justices are tasked
with trying to articulate the best interpretation of the Constitution. They seek to do this through reasoned opinions that
cannot invoke their own (or anyone else’s) moral or philosophical beliefs, but must be grounded in political values that reflect
their best understanding of the public conception of justice.98
They must justify their decisions with public reasons and fit
them into “a coherent constitutional view over the whole range
of their decisions.”99 As a result, the idea of public reason applies “more strictly” to judges, particularly to Supreme Court
justices, than to other members of society.100
Rawls was careful to clarify, however, that in marking out
the Supreme Court for an exemplary role in this context, he did
not intend to defend the practice of judicial review.101 He instead noted, rather ambiguously, judicial review “can perhaps
be defended given certain historical circumstances and conditions of political culture.”102 Part IV, infra, applies this claim to
the Indian context, and considers whether political and historical factors justify the Indian Supreme Court’s heavy-handed
exercise of judicial review.
C. Socioeconomic Rights as Constitutional Rights
The final component of this Article’s theoretical framework is
to connect Rawlsian political theory to legal constitutional theory. Here, it draws on the scholarship of Professor Frank
Michelman, who has contributed several academic papers on
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 236.
Id. at 235.
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 234.
See id. at 240.
Id. But see Michelman, Justice as Fairness, supra note 93, at 1413.

To say . . . that justice as fairness can take judicial review or leave it,
depending on the circumstances, is not to equivocate; it is rather to
take a stand. Judicial review being neither always required by justice nor always excluded by justice (so goes Rawls’s claim), the question of having it or not is a pragmatic one to be made with certain
justice-related concerns in view.
Id.
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the intersection of these two fields.103 The focus in much of this
scholarship is constitutional legitimacy. In particular, Michelman examines the extent to which constitutional law and the
practice of judicial review can be legitimate in light of substantive disagreements among citizens in a democratic society on
major questions of political justice.104
In The Constitution, Social Rights and Liberal Political Justification, Michelman addresses the effects of constitutional socioeconomic rights on a constitution’s legitimacy.105 As an initial
matter, he notes that part of the debate over whether it is wise
to confer constitutional status on socioeconomic guarantees
turns on substantive disagreements.106 For instance, not everyone believes that a moral and just society must include constitutional rights to food, adequate housing, or other means of social support. Yet, even those who are morally convinced that
socioeconomic guarantees should be given constitutional status
must overcome certain non-substantive objections to make a
persuasive case for such constitutionalization.107
The most common non-substantive objection to granting socioeconomic guarantees constitutional protection pertains to the
judiciary’s role in enforcing socioeconomic rights. The concern
is that courts will be “unable to make convincingly crisp assessments of the government’s compliance or non-compliance
with social rights guarantees, or to fashion apt and pointed re-

103. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 2; Frank I. Michelman, Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?, 8 REV. CONST. STUD. 101 (2004); Frank I.
Michelman, Living with Judicial Supremacy, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579
(2003); Frank I. Michelman, Ida’s Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental System, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (2003); Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Legitimation for Political Acts, 66 MODERN L. REV. 1 (2003); Frank
I. Michelman, Democracy-Based Resistance to a Constitutional Right of Social
Citizenship: A Comment on Forbath, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1893 (2001); Frank
I. Michelman, Human Rights and the Limits of Constitutional Theory, 13
RATIO JURIS 63 (2000). See also Jack M. Balkin, Respect-Worthy: Frank
Michelman and the Legitimate Constitution, 39 TULSA L. REV. 485 (2004)
(providing an overview of Professor Michelman’s work in this area).
104. See Balkin, supra note 103, at 485–86.
105. Michelman, supra note 2.
106. Id. at 22.
107. Id.
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medial orders . . . without getting themselves disastrously
mixed up in matters beyond their province and their ken.”108
While this is a valid concern, the terms of the debate would
be incomplete if the concern is solely (or even primarily) with
the judiciary’s proper role in a separation of powers framework
and its institutional competence. As Michelman points out, the
judiciary can play a “useful, if modest, role[] in the promotion of
distributive aims of social guarantees.”109 Alternatively, if
courts are barred from adjudicating questions of socioeconomic
justice, it “would not be a good argument against constitutionalization in the sight of anyone who believes that a morally legitimate political regime must include a visible, effective commitment” to certain positive entitlements provided by the
state.110
In Michelman’s view, even if we accept the above two points,
the positive case for constitutional socioeconomic rights is not
complete.111 He ventures beyond judiciary-related concerns and
sets out two more non-substantive objections to the constitutionalization of socioeconomic rights.112 First, he lays out a
“democratic objection”—namely that the placement of socioeconomic rights in a Constitution will unduly constrain democratic
decision making, regardless of whether courts are involved in
enforcing these rights.113 Second, there is a “contractarian objection” that opposes constitutionalization on the ground that
socioeconomic rights would be so indeterminate that rational
citizens, acting reasonably, could not agree to be governed by a
constitution that included such rights.114 On this view, the inclusion of socioeconomic rights in a constitution defeats one of
the fundamental purposes of a constitution—to provide liberal
political legitimacy to coercive laws and acts of the state.
Michelman suggests that both objections are manageable. He
says: (1) that their force depends on how sweepingly (or specifically) socioeconomic rights are couched; (2) that the contractarian objection is mitigated by the constraint of public reason;
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 22–23.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 23, 35.
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and (3) that the democratic objection is only grave if we accept
a narrow conception of democracy.115
1. The Democratic Objection
The democratic objection asserts that placing socioeconomic
guarantees in a constitution would excessively restrict democratic policymaking on a range of issues. William Forbath provides a “dramatic” illustration of this objection in his proposal
of constitutional rights to “social citizenship.”116 Going beyond
what he refers to as “welfare rights” (rights to a minimum
amount of money or of basic necessities for work), Forbath proposes constitutional rights to social citizenship that provide assurances so one can make a decent living through forms of social participation that provide the opportunity for selfimprovement, material interdependence, and security for all.117
Though Forbath does not define the exact contours of such
rights, they seem to affect a number of policy areas including
spending on public works, union and industrial policy, tax laws
and policies, workplace health and safety, immigration laws,
and trade policy.118 Thus, if socioeconomic rights are conceived
as constitutional rights to social citizenship, there might not be
a single issue on the political agenda left untouched.119
Michelman contrasts these vast social citizenship rights to
Section 26 of the South African Constitution, which requires
the government to take reasonable measures toward the progressive realization of adequate housing for all citizens.120 In
115. See id. at 23–24, 37–38.
116. Id. at 31; W.E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1887–88 (2001) [hereinafter Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights]. See also W.E. Forbath, Not So
Simple Justice: Frank Michelman on Social Rights, 1969-Present, 39 TULSA L.
REV. 597 (2004).
117. See Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights, supra note 116, at 1827
(“Centered on decent work, livelihoods, and social provision, [the social citizenship tradition] . . . read[s] the promise of the Antislavery and Reconstruction Amendments in ‘Free Labor’ terms, as a guarantee of opportunities for
self-improvement and a measure of material independence and security for
all.”); Michelman, supra note 2, at 31.
118. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 32; W.E. Forbath, Caste, Class and
Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 49 (1999).
119. Michelman, supra note 2, at 32–33.
120. See id. at 31–33; S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 26.
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Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, the
South African Constitutional Court held that governmenthousing measures did not meet the reasonableness standard
set forth under Section 26 and ordered the government to submit revised plans for judicial review.121
Here, as in many other cases before the South African Constitutional Court, the court required socioeconomic policies to
meet a not-too-burdensome reasonableness standard and did
not formulate its own solutions when the government failed to
meet that standard.122 This approach does not unduly interfere
with democratic policymaking. By contrast, Forbath’s social
citizenship rights would seem to remove many issues from the
policymaking agenda, or constrain the choices available to policymakers to a potentially intolerable extent in a representative
democracy. Thus, the strength of the democratic objection
turns, in part, on the way socioeconomic rights are couched in a
constitution.
Even if constitutional socioeconomic rights are couched
broadly as in Forbath’s conception, they still might be democratically acceptable. Assuming that policymakers in the elected branches take the constitution seriously and constitutional
rights figure prominently in their policymaking, it might still
be useful to include broad socioeconomic rights in a constitution to “give a certain inflection to political public reason.”123 In
this scenario—where the judiciary plays no role—elected officials would be forced to exercise judgment on how to make political choices that are conducive to social citizenship for all.
This requires moving away from the traditional definition of
democracy as “a series of free-for-all contests of normatively
unregulated preferences” toward a fuller conception of democracy as “the practice by which citizens communicatively form,
test, exchange, revise and pool their constitutional-interpretive

121. See Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1)
SA 46 (CC) at ¶ 93 (S. Afr.).
122. See generally HEINZ KLUG, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA: A
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 143–46 (2010).
123. Michelman, supra note 2, at 39. See also RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM,
supra note 7, at 212–20.
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judgments, only counting them as required to obtain . . . the
institutional settlements a country needs.”124
If democracy is defined in these broad and idealistic terms,
and if socioeconomic rights are couched narrowly (as in South
Africa), the democratic objection poses little threat to constitutional legitimacy. The Indian Supreme Court, however, has interpreted the Indian Constitution to include expansive socioeconomic rights that the judiciary can enforce in a manner that
undermines democratic policymaking.125 This strong form of
judicial review is perhaps only defensible in light of India’s history and political culture.126
2. The Contractarian Objection
The contractarian objection focuses on the difficulty of measuring government compliance with socioeconomic rights. Social
contractarians maintain that a citizen will only agree to abide
by a constitution—which provides the government coercive
power to compel her to act in prescribed ways and the ability to
make policy choices with which she disagrees—if she sees other
citizens and her government also complying with this constitution.127 This ability to observe others abiding by the constitution is essential. It allows each citizen to confirm that the con-

124. Michelman, supra note 2, at 40 (acknowledging that this is a “pretty
idealistic view of democracy” but noting that “the idea of liberal justice or
liberal legitimacy within any possible system of positive legal ordering”
seems to depend on this view).
125. See, e.g., SUPREME COURT ORDERS ON THE RIGHT TO FOOD: A TOOL FOR
ACTION
3–7
(2005),
available
at
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/interimorders.html [hereinafter A
TOOL FOR ACTION] (showing how a case on the Right to Food in six Indian
states has expanded to include all Indian states as respondents and how the
Court’s orders have been enforced through a number of interim orders and
specific policy directions to elected governments). But see Vishaka v. State of
Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011 (India) (drafting legal guidelines to protect
women from sexual harassment in the workplace in light of “a vacuum of
existing legislation,” but stating that these guidelines would be superseded
by duly enacted legislation in this area).
126. See infra Section V; RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at
240. See also Michelman, Justice as Fairness, supra note 93, at 1408.
127. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 35–36.
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stitution’s provisions, entailing commitments that make it universally acceptable, are in fact real.128
However, it might not be possible to identify when others, including the government, comply with constitutionally mandated socioeconomic rights. Imagine two societies that have enacted constitutional rights to sufficient food. In one society, the
government passes laws aimed at increasing agricultural production, improving the food distribution system, and giving
food stamps to everyone living below the poverty line. These
provisions will take ten years to supply adequate food to all citizens, but will provide a sustainable food supply thereafter. In
the second society, the government only passes one law that
mandates the immediate distribution of sufficient food to all
citizens living below the poverty line. Yet, food supplies are
limited, and in the long-term there will not be adequate food
production to supply everyone in need. In this hypothetical
scenario, one society has adopted laws that will gradually but
sustainably provide food for all, while the other provides food
immediately to every citizen in need at the cost of long-term
food security. Does one society comply with the right to food
while the other does not? If so, which one? Isn’t it plausible
that both (or neither) have fulfilled this right? It seems that
one cannot decisively say if such a right is or is not being satisfied.129
According to the contractarian objection, this “raging indeterminacy” prevents rational citizens, acting reasonably, from
determining when their government complies with or violates
socioeconomic rights.130 Constitutional legitimacy is therefore
threatened, as citizens will not consent to be governed by a
constitution when they cannot observe their government abiding by what should be universally accepted constitutional
commitments.131
Socioeconomic rights, as this argument goes, lack the “transparency” of civil and political rights.132 They cannot be “moreor-less detectably . . . realised (or not) at any given moment.”133
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 36.
See id.
See id. at 35–36.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id.
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Traditionally, civil and political rights, including, inter alia, the
right to the freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, due process, and equal protection were referred to as “negative
rights.”134 This is because civil and political rights protect individual liberty against state intrusion. Socioeconomic rights
concern distributive justice. They require the government to
provide positive entitlements to satisfy material needs or
wants, or to provide access to the means of satisfaction.135
The distinction between these two sets of rights has been criticized in the academic literature. Critics argue that the distinction is artificial because these rights interact in important
ways. In particular, they point out that those suffering from
serious want or need cannot effectively exercise civil and political rights.136 It is of little value to an individual dying of starvation or thirst, for instance, to have a constitutional right to
vote.
Nevertheless, the contractarian objection relies on this distinction. It depends on the premise that it is significantly more
difficult to gauge compliance with or violations of socioeconomic
rights than of civil and political rights.137 This perceived indeterminacy of socioeconomic rights also factored into Rawls’s decision to defer questions of socioeconomic justice to the legislative process after the constitutional essentials (including a
scheme of basic liberties or negative rights) are decided.138

134. See Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857,
863–65 (2001); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88
MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2272 (1990).
135. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 22.
136. See generally SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED:
POSITIVE RIGHTS AND POSITIVE DUTIES (2008); HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS:
SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2d ed. 1996). But see
Cross, supra note 134, at 866–68 (defending the distinction between negative
and positive rights on the grounds that negative rights would be automatically fulfilled if no government existed but positive rights would not).
137. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 36.
138. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 48 (noting that determining if the second principle is fulfilled is “always open to reasonable differences of opinion . . . [it] depend[s] on inference and judgment in assessing
complex social and economic information”). See also Michelman, Justice as
Fairness, supra note 93 at 1409–10.
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Still, constitutionalized socioeconomic rights are not fatal to
contractarian legitimacy under Rawlsian theory.139 Under
Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy, a constitution is only
legitimate if all its citizens, who are rationally self-interested
and reasonable, consent to be governed by its essentials.140
Since socioeconomic rights are not part of the scheme of “constitutionally essential” negative rights, reasonable minds can
disagree as to their implementation, but must express their
views pursuant to the constraint of public reason.141 Thus, citizens and public institutions must be willing to explain and defend their votes on matters of socioeconomic justice, in a manner that reflects their honest best judgments on how to ensure
socioeconomic justice for all.142 This “eases the strain on constitutional contractarians” because policy choices in this realm
would simply have to accord with some conception of a complete, legitimate constitutional agreement that all rational citizens, acting reasonably, would accept.143 However, if citizens
cannot reasonably maintain confidence that their policymaking
institutions are fulfilling the constraint of public reason, then
the “extant system of positive legal ordering is unjust.”144
Thus, the move to public reason allows a range of distributive
policies and laws to be acceptable from a contractarian perspective. This is particularly true if socioeconomic guarantees are
given the status of “directive principles” rather than “rights.”145
These principles would guide public decision making on matters of socioeconomic justice, but leave it to elected representatives to fashion the most effective laws and policies.
The following section shows how the drafters of the Indian
Constitution sought to avoid this contractarian difficulty by
addressing socioeconomic justice through non-binding “Di-

139. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 37–38.
140. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 41.
141. Id. at 38; see RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 214.
142. Michelman, supra note 2, at 38.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 37–39. Cf. Michelman, Poverty in Liberalism, supra note 72,
at 1017–19 (noting that instead of making most socioeconomic rights constitutionally essential, Rawls attached great importance to transparency in the
adjudication of these rights as the means to effectively pursue justice).
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rective Principles of State Policy” that would “give a certain
inflection to political public reason.”146
II. THE FRAMING OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION
A. Directive Principles and Article 21
India gained independence from British rule in 1947 and
adopted a Constitution in 1950, which remains in force today.147 The drafting of the Constitution began prior to independence with the formation of a Constituent Assembly that
began its work in December 1946.148 Their final product, a
sprawling document of more than 300 articles and twelve
schedules, balanced “negative” protections of individual liberty
from government interference with “positive” guidelines for socioeconomic justice.149 Thus, Part III of the Constitution, entitled “Fundamental Rights,” sets forth a list of justiciable rights,
including the rights to life, freedom of speech, and freedom of
religion that was modeled largely on the American Bill of
Rights.150 Part IV of the Constitution, by contrast, contains
“Directive Principles of State Policy”—nonjusticiable economic
and social provisions to be progressively realized by the Indian
state. As Granville Austin put it, Part IV “set forth the humanitarian precepts that were . . . the aims of the Indian Social
Revolution.”151
According to Austin, the Indian Constitution was, at its core,
a “social document.”152 He noted that the Constituent Assembly
sought to design a Constitution that would bring about social
revolution in India.153 This ambitious goal had its roots in the
struggle for independence, as the Indian National Congress
was founded primarily to demand rights for Indian citizens

146. Michelman, supra note 2, at 39.
147. See INDIA CONST.
148. See AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 3–8, 58 (1966).
149. See Manoj Mate, The Origins of Due Process of India: The Role of Borrowing in Personal Liberty and Preventative Detention Cases, 28 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 216, 218–19 (2010).
150. See id. at 219; AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 55.
151. AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 75.
152. Id. at 50.
153. Id. at 26–27, 50.
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from the British Raj.154 It set forth these demands in various
resolutions, including the Constitution of India Bill (1895), the
Commonwealth of India Bill (1925), and the Karachi Resolution (1931). The Karachi Resolution was the first public demand for positive rights toward greater socioeconomic justice.155 The Resolution proclaimed, “in order to end the exploitation of the masses, political freedom must include the real
economic freedom of the starving millions.”156
Austin and others have argued that members of the Constituent Assembly (or “framers”) placed such high value on socioeconomic justice that they did not differentiate between Parts
III and IV of the Constitution in terms of importance.157 However, the members disagreed as to whether the directive principles should be justiciable. Before the Constituent Assembly
was formed, the most significant writing on this issue was the
Sapru Report of 1945, which outlined a scheme of fundamental
rights intended to alleviate the fears of minority groups.158 The
Sapru Report’s most significant contribution was to distinguish
between justiciable and nonjusticiable rights, even though it
was in the context of minority protections with no mention of
negative and positive rights.159
B.N. Rau, one of the principal architects of Part IV, adopted
the distinction between justiciable and nonjusticiable rights
and applied it to the drafting of the Constitution. Rau was a
member of the Drafting Committee, for which he assembled a
set of precedents that the committee could draw on for ideas

154. See id. at 50–54; Mate, supra note 149, at 224–25.
155. See AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 56; Mate, supra note 149, at 225.
156. AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 56 (referencing
the Resolution on Fundamental Rights and Economic and Social Change,
adopted in Karachi in March 1931) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. See id. at 52. See also P.K. TRIPATHI, SPOTLIGHTS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 293 (1972) (arguing that in comparison to fundamental
rights, “directive principles . . . do not constitute a set of inferior and subsidiary principles”); See Singh, supra note 5, at 28–30. Cf. Jagat Narain, Judicial
Law Making and the Place of Directive Principles in Indian Constitution, 27
J. INDIAN L. INST. 198, 203 (1985) (arguing that “directive principles are superior to fundamental rights”).
158. See AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 57.
159. See id.; Mate, supra note 149, at 226.
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and inspiration.160 Rau relied heavily on the Irish constitutional model, which included Directive Principles of State Policy.
He believed India should emulate the Irish model by setting
out positive rights “in the nature of moral precepts for the authorities of the State.”161
Other members of the Drafting Committee felt that this approach did not go far enough. They believed the Indian Constitution should include justiciable socioeconomic rights. K.M.
Munshi, for instance, put forth draft lists of the “Rights of
Workers” and “Social Rights,” which included the right to a living wage and protections for women and children.162 B.R.
Ambedkar, who famously rose from disadvantaged beginnings—he belonged to a scheduled (untouchable) caste—to become the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, favored an extensive set of rights for members of minority communities, particularly the scheduled castes.163 He also pushed for a social
scheme to nationalize all major industries that would take effect ten years after the Constitution was adopted.164 Similarly,
Drafting Committee member K.T. Shah believed that even if
directive principles were initially nonbinding, they should become justiciable after a specified time.165 He also believed that
all natural resources and key industries should become property of the state.166
These views reflect the deep-seated socialist beliefs of many
Constituent Assembly members, which largely derived from
the negative association between British imperialism and capitalism.167 As ex-colonial subjects, the framers were wary of replacing British capitalists—who were widely seen as exploiting
Indian resources for the benefit of the home country—with
homegrown Indian capitalists.168 They also believed that India’s very survival rested on their ability to bring about a rapid
160. See generally B.N. RAU, CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENTS, THIRD SERIES
(1947).
161. Id. at 22.
162. See AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 78.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 79.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 60.
168. See id. at 60–61.
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socioeconomic transformation among the poverty-stricken
“masses.”169 Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister,
stated that the first task of the Constituent Assembly was “to
free India through a new constitution, to feed the starving people, and to clothe the naked masses, and to give every Indian
the fullest opportunity to develop himself.”170 If the Assembly
failed to bring about this social revolution, Nehru warned “all
our paper constitutions will become useless and purposeless . . .
if India goes down, all will go down.”171
Still, despite their strong socialist leanings, the Drafting
Committee—and eventually the Constituent Assembly—
adopted the Irish model that separated justiciable fundamental
rights from non-enforceable directive principles.172 There appear to be two separate motivations behind this decision. First,
the framers wanted to leave some discretion to the legislature
on matters of socioeconomic justice, rather than tie their hands
with binding constitutional provisions. Ambedkar’s social
scheme, other proposals for enforceable rights, and time-bound
provisions toward greater socioeconomic justice were rejected
on these grounds.173 Ambedkar eventually came around to support nonbinding directive principles, believing that future legislatures would be compelled to fulfill their mandate or “answer
for them before the electorate at election time.”174
A second motivation to separate justiciable fundamental
rights from nonenforceable directive principles was Assembly
members’ skepticism of the judiciary and desire to minimize its
impact on social legislation.175 B.N. Rau visited the United
States in 1947 where he met with U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Felix Frankfurter.176 Frankfurter, a noted proponent of judicial
169. See id.
170. STUART CORBRIDGE & JOHN HARRISS, REINVENTING INDIA:
LIBERALIZATION, HINDU NATIONALISM AND POPULAR DEMOCRACY 20 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
171. AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 27 (referencing
the Constituent Assembly Debates) (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. Id. at 79–80; RAU, supra note 160, at 21.
173. Id. at 78.
174. Id. (referencing Constituent Assembly Debates).
175. See Rajeev Dhavan, Law as Struggle: Public Interest Law in India, 36
J. INDIAN L. INST. 302, 312–14. (1994).
176. See Mate, supra note 149, at 221; AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION,
supra note 20, at 103.
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restraint, generally opposed U.S. Supreme Court decisions that
struck down legislative or executive acts.177 In his view, wideranging judicial review was not only burdensome to the judiciary, but also undemocratic for allowing a few unelected judges
to invalidate laws and orders issued by elected officials.178
Frankfurter strongly influenced Rau, who convinced the Drafting Committee to remove the words “due process” from Article
21 of the Constitution.179 As a result, the final version of Article
21 reads, “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to procedure established by law”.180
Thus, under the original understanding of Article 21, the Indian state may deprive individuals of life or liberty as long as it
follows some legal process, the content or fairness of which lies
outside the domain of judicial review.
Additionally, the Constituent Assembly adopted the judicial
conservatism of their former British rulers. According to Rajeev
Dhavan, the British took pains “to ensure that the courts of the
Raj were not empowered to question governmental action.”181
“Judges were selected for their conservatism, loyalty and independence,” creating a judiciary that was a “safe institution.”182
The British therefore created a tradition of judicial passivity
that was passed on to the Constituent Assembly members. For
instance, Ambedkar expressed the framers’ general view that
the judiciary should remain independent from political interference but should nonetheless limit its review of government
policies. He stated before the Assembly, “the judiciary is engaged in deciding issue(s) between citizens, and very rarely be177. See, e.g., Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940).
But to the legislature no less than to courts is committed the guardianship of deeply-cherished liberties . . . To fight out the wise use of
legislative authority in the forum of public opinion and before legislative assemblies rather than to transfer such a contest to the judicial arena, serves to vindicate the self-confidence of a free people.
Id.
178. See Mate, supra note 149, at 221. See also Dhavan, supra note 175, at
313 (stating that the drafters of the Indian Constitution were “[f]earful of the
American New Deal experience”).
179. See Mate, supra note 149, at 222.
180. INDIA CONST. art. 21. (emphasis added).
181. Dhavan, supra note 175, at 313.
182. Id.
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tween citizens and Government. Consequently, the chances of
influencing the . . . judiciary by the government are very remote.”183
Thus, Ambedkar, Rau, and the other drafters were not proponents of a strong judiciary. They were wary of New Deal jurisprudence from the United States,184 and were steeped in the
British tradition of judicial conservatism. This influenced the
drafting of Article 21 and probably influenced the drafting of
the directive principles as well. Though most (if not all) of the
framers had strong socialist convictions, they agreed in the end
to separate justiciable rights (Part III) from non-binding directive principles (Part IV). The drafting of Parts III and IV
therefore do not reflect the framers’ socialist views as much as
their twin desires to defer to the legislature on matters of socioeconomic justice and to limit the power and reach of the judiciary.
To clearly separate these two Parts of the Constitution, the
framers placed unambiguous textual commands to indicate
that fundamental rights in Part III are justiciable, but that directive principles in Part IV are not. Article 32 of the Constitution guarantees the right of individual citizens “to move the
Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement” of fundamental rights.185 Article 37, though, states that
directive principles “shall not be enforceable by any court, but
the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental
in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the
183. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. The drafters were likely aware and wary of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
move toward incorporating the Bill of Rights against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474–75 & n.1
(1942) (Black, J., dissenting); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68–123
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). For
an overview of New Deal jurisprudence, see Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional
Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of the New Jurisprudential Deal,
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 460 (2001) (noting that the New Deal judicial revolution “extended well beyond the political goals of the New Deal Democrats”
and that the Court spoke of applying the Bill of Rights against the states as
early as 1937). See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1196–97 (1992) (describing the various judicial philosophies that informed the incorporation debate).
185. INDIA CONST. art. 32. Article 226 extends this right to the High Courts.
Id. art. 226.
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State to apply these principles in making laws.”186 This rule
clearly prevents the judiciary from enforcing directive principles against the Indian State.
B. Standing (Locus Standi) Requirements for Article 32
Article 32 is the primary mechanism in the Indian Constitution to redress violations of fundamental rights. Ambedkar referred to it as the heart and soul of the Constitution, emphasizing its vital role in preventing government from encroaching
upon individual rights.187
Article 32 empowers the Indian Supreme Court to grant a
range of remedies.188 It provides that the Court may issue “directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari” as it deems appropriate in a given case.189 Article 32 also
states that citizens may move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of a right through “appropriate proceedings.”190 This
grants the Court some discretion to determine the procedure
through which citizens may bring petitions alleging fundamental rights violations.191
In the Court’s early jurisprudence, the phrase “appropriate
proceedings” was construed narrowly to permit only those individuals whose rights had been directly infringed to bring
suit.192 Much like the framers who were strongly influenced by
British notions of judicial conservatism, the Supreme Court
borrowed from the Anglo-American legal tradition to adopt
strict standing (or locus standi) requirements under Article
32.193

186. Id. art. 37.
187. S.P. Sathe, Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience, 6 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 29, 39 (2001); P.P. Craig & S.L. Deshpande, Rights, Autonomy and
Process: Public Interest Litigation in India, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 356, 357
(1989).
188. INDIA CONST. art. 32.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See MADHAV KHOSLA, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 120–21 (2012) [hereinafter KHOSLA, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION].
192. See Craig & Deshpande, supra note 187, at 357.
193. See id.
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In Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India (1951), the Court held that
a shareholder of a company did not have standing under Article
32 to petition the Court to enforce a corporation’s right to hold
and dispose of property under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.194 The Court noted that a corporation and its shareholders
are separate entities, and therefore only the corporation could
properly bring this claim.195
Similarly, in G.C. College Silchar v. Gauhati University
(1973), petitioners challenged a resolution by a Gauhati University’s Academic Council to retain English and introduce the
native language (Assamese) as the languages of instruction.196
The petitioners claimed that this resolution violated their
rights under Articles 29 and 30 (allowing minorities to enroll in
any educational institution of their choice and preventing the
state from discriminating against minorities in academic admissions, respectively) of the Constitution.197 Prior to this resolution, the university had used Bengali alongside English to
help students understand the content of English-language lectures.198 Despite the fact that one petitioner was a Bengalispeaking student, the Court found that “the impugned resolution does not presently affect the petitioners.”199 Thus, it held
that the petitioners lacked standing to file this petition.200
These cases evince a broader pattern in the Court’s early jurisprudence to deny standing under Article 32 unless petitioners could demonstrate that an impugned law had directly
harmed them.201 However, as the following section shows, the
Court would later relax its standing requirements to allow any
person to move for the enforcement of the fundamental rights
of other individuals and groups too disadvantaged to file petitions themselves.202
194. See Chowdhuri v. Union of India, (1951) S.C.R. 869 (India).
195. Id.
196. See G.C. College Silchar v. Gauhati University, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 761 ¶
1–2 (India).
197. See id. ¶ 1.
198. See id. ¶ 4.
199. Id.
200. Id.; see also Craig & Deshpande, supra note 187, at 358.
201. See Craig & Deshpande, supra note 187, at 357–58.
202. See id. at 360–61; Clark D. Cunningham, Public Interest Litigation in
Indian Supreme Court: A Study in the Light of American Experience, 29 J.
INDIAN L. INST. 494, 498–99 (1987).
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III. EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS,
PROCEDURAL INNOVATIONS AND THE JUDICIARY’S EXPANDING
ROLE
This Section will show how the Indian Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with respect to both Article 21 and Article 32 has
transformed dramatically since the early years of the Indian
republic. At the time of their adoption, Articles 21 and 32 of the
Indian Constitution were construed narrowly. Drawing from
Justice Frankfurter and the British views of judicial restraint,
Article 21 was carefully drafted to exclude any mention of “due
process” in favor of the phrase “procedure established by
law.”203 This sought to avoid the “substantive due process” doctrine that emerged in the United States, and permitted the
government to deprive citizens of life or liberty as long as it
acted pursuant to a duly enacted law. Similarly, relying on
American and British jurisprudence, the Supreme Court’s early
cases imposed strict standing requirements on petitioners under Article 32.204 Thus, only petitioners directly harmed by a
disputed law could petition the Court to redress violations of
the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution.
Over time, Article 21 has not only evolved toward Americanstyle due process,205 but has also been read to encompass the
right to “live with dignity,”206 which includes socioeconomic
rights. Meanwhile, Article 32 standing requirements have been
relaxed through the development of public interest litigation
(“PIL”).207 These changes allow any citizen to petition the Court
to redress fundamental rights violations suffered by disadvantaged individuals or groups. The advent of PIL has also
brought about a series of procedural innovations that give the

203. See INDIA CONST. art. 21. See Mate, supra note 149, at 222; Dhavan,
supra note 175, at 313.
204. See Craig & Deshpande, supra note 187, at 357–59.
205. See Mate, supra note 149, at 218.
206. See Mullin v. Adm’r, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516, 529
(India).
207. See Cunningham, supra note 202, at 498; Craig & Deshpande, supra
note 187, at 359–65.
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courts greater authority in monitoring and enforcing rightsprotective schemes.208
These substantive and procedural developments in the law
have fundamentally altered the judiciary’s role within the Indian constitutional framework. In particular, there has been an
increase in (1) the range of rights that courts can enforce; (2)
the number of people that are permitted to file (and are affected by) petitions alleging fundamental rights violations; and (3)
the extent to which the courts can supervise the implementation of their orders. Together, these developments vest a great
deal of additional authority in the judiciary at the expense of
democratic decision making in the elected branches of government.
A. The Evolution of Article 21
1. Early Cases
In its early years, the Indian Supreme Court remained faithful to the original understanding of Article 21. In the first major case to examine Article 21, Gopalan v. State of Madras
(1950), the Supreme Court declined to adopt an expansive interpretation.209 In Gopalan, the primary issue was whether certain provisions of the Preventative Detention Act of 1950 violated Articles 13, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution.210 The
petitioner, who was detained pursuant to this Act, drew on the
U.S. Constitution to argue that the Court should interpret Article 21 in line with American jurisprudence on the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.211 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Kania rejected this argument, noting, inter alia, that the
word “liberty” in Article 21 means merely “personal liberty,”
whereas in the American context, liberty has a more expansive
meaning.212 The Chief Justice also looked to the Constituent
Assembly debates to establish that the words “due process”
were intentionally omitted in favor of the more government208. See generally KHOSLA, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 191, at
120–22; Craig & Deshpande, supra note 187.
209. See Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 88, 111 (India); Mate,
supra note 149, at 232.
210. See Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 88, 95 (India).
211. See id. at 107.
212. See id. at 111.
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friendly “procedure established by law.”213 Thus, the Court held
that Article 21 permitted the state to deprive an individual of
liberty as long as it did so pursuant to a “procedure prescribed
by the law of the state.”214
The Gopalan Court’s interpretation of Article 21, which rejected broad interpretations of “liberty” and analogies to American due process, was later challenged and rejected. The move
away from Gopalan began in the landmark case Keshavananda
Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala (1973).215 While this
case did not address the meaning of Article 21, it had lasting
implications on constitutional interpretation generally.216
Keshavananda held that amendments to the Constitution are
invalid if they violate the “basic structure” of the Constitution.217 Article 368 of the Indian Constitution permits amendments if they are adopted by a two-thirds majority in both
houses of Parliament.218 However, according to Justice Khanna
in Keshavananda, the words “this Constitution” and “the Constitution shall stand amended” that appear in Article 368 are
evidence of a constitutional identity that the legislature did not
have the authority to alter.219 For instance, an amendment
abolishing the Supreme Court would be invalid, as it would
fundamentally alter the separation of powers framework of the
Constitution.
For the purposes of this Article, Keshavananda is significant
for three reasons. First, it replaced the framer’s model of parliamentary supremacy with a form of judicial supremacy, signaling a change in the allocation of power among branches of
213. See id. at 111–12.
214. See id. at 111; See also Madhav Khosla, Addressing Judicial Activism
in the Indian Supreme Court: Towards an Evolved Debate, 32 HASTINGS INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 55, 83–84 (2009).
215. See Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461, ¶
1518 (India).
216. See Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Inner Conflict of Constitutionalism: Judicial Review and the ‘Basic Structure,’ in INDIA’S LIVING CONSTITUTION 179–
81 (Zoya Hasan, Eswaran Sridharan & R. Sudarshan eds., Anthem Press
2005).
217. See Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461, ¶
1599 (India).
218. See INDIA CONST. art. 368.
219. See Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461, ¶
1481–82 (India); KHOSLA, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 191, at 153.
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government.220 Second, it paved the way for future cases that
describe the content of the Constitution’s “basic structure,” in
which the Supreme Court equates fundamental rights with directive principles in terms of their importance. For instance, in
Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980), Justice Chandrachud stated that Parts III and IV of the Constitution act “like a
twin formula for achieving a social revolution which is the ideal
. . . the visionary founders of the Constitution set before themselves.”221 This laid the foundation for the Supreme Court to
rule that Article 21 includes socioeconomic rights within its
ambit. Finally, Keshavananda provided the impetus for many
of the laws and constitutional amendments passed during the
era of Emergency Rule.222
2. Emergency Rule and Its Aftermath
Emergency Rule (1975–77) was declared by Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi to allow her to remain in power and rule by executive decree following widespread calls for her resignation. In
1975, Mrs. Gandhi was convicted by the Allahabad High Court
for election fraud in the 1971 general elections.223 In the face of
strong pressure to resign, Mrs. Gandhi declared a state of
emergency in June 1975. Her regime then suspended habeas
corpus, severely restricted civil liberties and the freedom of the
press, and sought to weaken the judiciary.224
In fact, Mrs. Gandhi’s administration had openly attacked
the judiciary prior to declaring Emergency Rule.225 In reaction
to the Keshavananda decision in 1973, Mrs. Gandhi went
against tradition and installed her own pro-government nominee—who had dissented in Keshavananda—as Chief Justice of

220. See Mehta, supra note 216, at 180. But see KHOSLA, THE INDIAN
CONSTITUTION, supra note 191, at 155–60 (arguing that Keshavananda’s impact has been exaggerated in the academic literature).
221. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1981) 1 S.C.R. 206, 208–09 (India); Mehta, supra note 216, at 198 (internal quotation marks omitted).
222. See Granville Austin, The Expected and the Unintended in Working a
Democratic Constitution, in INDIA’S LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 216, at
324–25.
223. See Mate, supra note 149, at 243.
224. See id.
225. See Austin, supra note 222, at 325–26; Dhavan, supra note 175, at 316.
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the Supreme Court, ahead of three more senior justices.226 This
sort of political manipulation of the judiciary increased during
Emergency Rule, as Mrs. Gandhi’s regime transferred judges
from one High Court to another as punishment for ruling
against the central government.227
The Emergency Rule era also witnessed the passage of four
constitutional amendments that were designed to limit the judiciary’s power.228 The most controversial was the Forty-second
Amendment, which prohibited judicial review of the disputed
1971 election, overturned Keshavananda by barring the Supreme Court from reviewing constitutional amendments, and
required a two-third majority of Court benches to hold statutes
unconstitutional.229 Even more radically, the Forty-second
Amendment gave the nonjusticiable directive principles in Part
IV of the Constitution precedence over the fundamental rights
in Part III.230 Ostensibly, this amendment was supposed to
vindicate the framers’ vision for social revolution, but in reality
it permitted the government to detain thousands of political
opponents without charge and impose an authoritarian socialist vision on the country that the framers, with their reverence
for democracy, would never have supported.231
Fortunately, Emergency Rule ended less than two years later
in March 1977. Mrs. Gandhi finally called for elections and her
Indian National Congress Party was defeated by the opposition
Janata Party.232 The Janata Party moved quickly to rescind the
controversial constitutional amendments passed by Mrs. Gandhi’s regime, and also repealed the Emergency Rule era laws
that suppressed free speech and suspended habeas corpus.233
Emergency Rule still left a lasting impression on the status of
directive principles under the Indian Constitution. After the
226. See Austin, supra note 222, at 326; Long March of the Supreme Court
Bar Association, SUPREME COURT BAR ASS’N,
http://www.lexsite.com/services/network/scba/history.shtml (last visited Aug.
25, 2013).
227. See Dhavan, supra note 175, at 316.
228. See Mate, supra note 149, at 243.
229. Id.
230. See Austin, supra note 222, at 324–25.
231. See Austin, supra note 222, at 325.
232. See Mate, supra note 149, at 244.
233. See id.
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repeal of the Forty-second Amendment—which had, inter alia,
overruled Keshavananda and made directive principles superior to fundamental rights—the Supreme Court relied on Keshavananda to hold that directive principles and fundamental
rights are equivalent parts of the “basic structure” of the Constitution.234 In making this bold claim, the Court, much like
Mrs. Gandhi’s regime, cited the need for social revolution. It
drew inspiration from the framers, quoting Nehru for the proposition that while fundamental rights are “static,” directive
principles “represent a dynamic move towards a certain objective.”235 The Court did not put forth any legal reasons to explain why directive principles should be placed on the same
footing as fundamental rights.236 Nevertheless, it did not merely declare that Parts III and IV of the Constitution were equivalent, but actually ruled in a series of cases that the directive
principles were justiciable under the right to life in Article 21.
3. Maneka Gandhi and the Right to “Live with Dignity”
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Maneka Gandhi
v. Union of India (1978) dramatically expanded the meaning of
Article 21.237 Maneka Gandhi, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s
daughter-in-law, alleged that the ruling Janata government
had illegally seized her passport pursuant to the Passport Act
of 1967.238 She argued that the Act contained no procedural
guidelines for how to seize a citizen’s passport, and even if such
a procedure existed, “it was arbitrary and unreasonable” and
therefore violated, inter alia, Article 21 of the Constitution.239
Writing for the Court, Justice Bhagwati construed the phrase
“personal liberty” in Article 21 broadly to bring within its am234. See Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1981) 1 S.C.R. 206, 208 (India); Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 1 (India).
235. See Waman Rao, (1981) 2 S.C.R. at 24 (India) (quoting from Prime
Minister Nehru’s speech in a Parliamentary Debate).
236. See Mehta, supra note 216, at 198 (“Other than a hortatory appeal to
the need for a social revolution, the court did not advance reasons for why the
directive principles are an expression of the equal standing of free and independent citizens in the same way that fundamental rights are.”).
237. See Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621, 670 (India).
238. See id. at 622.
239. Id.; see also Mate, supra note 149, at 245–46; Khosla, supra note 214,
at 84.
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bit the right to travel abroad.240 He said “[t]he expression ‘personal liberty’ in Article 21 is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man.”241 These rights include the right to equality under
Article 14 and the right to freedom (including freedom of
speech and to practice any profession) under Article 19. Justice
Bhagwati further observed that the relevant statute did not
provide a reasonable opportunity for the petitioner “to be heard
in advance before impounding a passport.”242 He therefore argued that principles of “natural justice” and fairness had to be
read into Article 21 so as “to invest law with fairness.”243
The Court held that the Act arbitrarily deprived petitioner of
personal liberty under Article 21.244 Through its decision, the
Court implicitly overruled Gopalan by adopting a due process
standard drawn from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the U.S. Constitution.245 Despite the framers’ purposeful omission of the words “due process,” the Court here expanded the
meaning Article 21—and thereby expanded its own authority—
to require the government to show not only that a deprivation
of life or liberty is conducted pursuant to a procedure established by law, but also that this procedure is reasonable and
not “arbitrary, fanciful, or oppressive.”246
The Maneka Gandhi judgment also set the stage for a further
expansion of Article 21 that would embrace socioeconomic principles as justiciable rights. Justice Bhagwati hinted at this development in his majority opinion:
Articles dealing with different fundamental rights contained
in Part III of the Constitution do not represent entirely separate streams of rights which do not mingle at many points.
They are all parts of an integrated scheme in the Constitution. Their waters must mix to constitute that grand flow of
unimpeded and impartial justice (social, economic and politi240. See Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621, 628 (India).
241. Id. at 670.
242. Id. at 629.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 671.
245. See Mate, supra note 149, at 249; Sathe, supra note 187, at 55–56. But
see Khosla, supra note 214, at 84 (stating that Maneka did not overrule Gopalan).
246. Khosla, supra note 214, at 84; Mate, supra note 149, at 248.
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cal), freedom (not only of thought, expression, belief, faith and
worship, but also of association, movement, vocation or occupation as well as of acquisition and possession of reasonable
property), or equality (of status and of opportunity, which imply absence of unreasonable or unfair discrimination between
individuals, groups and classes), and of fraternity (assuring
dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation).247

Such broad rights-protective language signaled the Court’s
expanding approach to fundamental rights. This excerpt makes
a powerful rhetorical case for the interconnectedness of various
rights, which the Court would go on to implement through the
right to life in Article 21.
Socioeconomic rights were included within the ambit of Article 21 in Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi
(1981). In this case, the Supreme Court had to determine
whether a detainee held in preventative detention had the
right to meet with his lawyer and family.248 While the case only
raised this narrow issue, the Court, led by Justice Bhagwati,
saw an opportunity to further expand the meaning of Article
21. It held that the right to life includes a broader right to “live
with human dignity.”249 This included “the bare [necessities] of
life such as nutrition, clothing, and shelter.”250 In adopting this
expansive interpretation, Justice Bhagwati made clear his belief in a flexible, adaptive reading of the Constitution. In his
view, “[A] constitutional provision must be construed, not in a
narrow and constricted sense, but in a wide and liberal manner
so as to anticipate and take account of changing conditions and
purposes.”251
The Supreme Court would follow this interpretative approach
in later cases to hold that the right to life includes, inter alia,
the rights to education,252 food,253 shelter,254 health and medical
247. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621, 648 (India).
248. Mullin v. Adm’r, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516, 520
(India).
249. Id. at 518.
250. Id. at 529.
251. Id. at 517.
252. See Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 S.C.R. 594, 719 (India).
253. See, e.g., PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001)
(India).
254. See Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., (1985) 2 S.C.R. Supp. 51, 83 (India).
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care,255 and a livelihood.256 Thus, a range of justiciable socioeconomic rights has been realized since the Francis Coralie decision. To accomplish this feat, the Supreme Court substantively
relied on an expansive reading of Article 21 where, despite the
clear language in Article 37 stating that directive principles are
not judicially enforceable,257 the right to life was held to encompass a right to live with dignity and therefore many of the
directive principles.
This substantive change in the law expanded the Court’s authority to strike down legislation as incompatible with fundamental rights. Procedural changes—particularly with regard to
standing requirements—also contributed to broadening judicial
authority. These procedural modifications permit a greater
number of citizens to bring claims of fundamental rights violations and empower the Court to actively monitor the implementation of its remedial schemes.
B. The Development of Public Interest Litigation (PIL)
PIL arose in response to a fundamental change in the Indian
judiciary during the 1980s and 1990s in which the courts took
an active role in promoting socioeconomic justice.258 The Supreme Court facilitated this process by instituting procedural
changes, which allowed (and encouraged) public interest organizations to file petitions on behalf of disadvantaged groups to
hold the government accountable for large-scale violations of
fundamental rights.
PIL was a fundamentally new sort of litigation. It moved
away from the traditional model of winner-take-all contests between two parties (or interests), where the judge acted as a
passive referee, and courts focused on providing compensation

255. See, e.g., Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of W.B., (1996)
4 S.C.C. 37 (India).
256. See Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., (1985) 2 S.C.R. Supp. 51, 83 (India).
257. See INDIA CONST. art. 37.
258. See Cunningham, supra note 202, at 494–96. See also Abram Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976)
(describing a similar transformation in American law); See Baxi, supra note
6, at 108–11 (preferring the term “social action litigation” to differentiate the
Indian and American experiences).
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for past wrongs.259 Under the PIL paradigm, lawsuits involve a
number of affected individuals or groups, judges assume an active role in shaping litigation, and courts order various forms of
relief in addition to compensation, including prospective relief
that is monitored and reevaluated from time to time after litigation ends.260
The Indian Supreme Court developed PIL in the postEmergency Rule era through a series of procedural innovations. The adoption of more liberal standing rules was one of
the most significant innovations. Recall that the Court’s early
cases imposed strict standing requirements that permitted only
individuals directly affected by an impugned law to file petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution.261 However, Article
32 does not require this restrictive approach, as it sets forth the
right of individual citizens to petition the Supreme Court via
“appropriate proceedings” to enforce fundamental rights.262
The Court’s interpretation of “appropriate proceedings” would
shift over time toward the provision of greater social justice.
The transformation began in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar
Union v. Union of India (1981).263 In this case, the Chief Justice’s majority opinion hewed to the traditional view that
standing under Article 32 should remain primarily with those
individuals whose rights had been directly affected.264 However, Justice Iyer, joined by Justice Bhagwati, wrote a concurring
opinion that adopted a much broader approach. In their view,
“locus standi must be liberalized to meet the challenges” facing
a developing country like India.265
This approach later prevailed in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India
(1982).266 The petitioners in this case brought a number of
claims alleging government interference with the judiciary. For
259. See Cunningham, supra note 202, at 494; Chayes, supra note 258, at
1282–83.
260. See Cunningham, supra note 202, at 494.
261. See supra Part II.B; see also Chowdhuri v. Union of India, (1951)
S.C.R. 869 (India); G.C. College Silchar v. Gauhati University, A.I.R. 1973
S.C. 761 (India).
262. INDIA CONST. art. 32.
263. Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India (1981) 2 S.C.R. 52, 54
(India).
264. See id. at 65.
265. Id. at 66–71; Craig & Deshpande, supra note 187, at 358.
266. See S.P. Gupta v. President of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365 (India).
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instance, they challenged a policy that gave judges only shortterm appointments, which they claimed had perverse effects on
judicial independence.267 The Indian Government objected to
this writ petition on the grounds that the petitioners were not
the judges themselves.268 As a result, the government argued
they had not been directly injured by this policy and lacked
standing to file a petition under Article 32.269 The Court rejected this argument in a majority opinion written by Justice
Bhagwati.270 According to Justice Bhagwati, traditional standing rules were no longer appropriate because they developed
“when private law dominated the legal scene and public law
had not yet been born.”271 “Public law” here refers to landmark
cases like Maneka Gandhi and Francis Coralie—Justice
Bhagwati wrote the majority opinion in both cases—that transformed the meaning of Article 21 to take into account the social
and economic conditions of the public at large.272 Thus, to adapt
to this new era of public law, the Court rejected the traditional
view of standing and recognized the right of any member of the
public to petition for redress of a wrong to a “person or to a determinate class of persons . . . (who) by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially disadvantaged position” cannot
approach the Court themselves.273 S.P. Gupta empowered citizens to file claims of fundamental rights violations on behalf of
others less fortunate, a monumental change from the original
rule requiring direct injury to petition the Court under Article
32.
According to Craig and Deshpande, in their seminal article
on the rise of PIL, two major themes emerge from the Court’s
reasoning for this radical shift in standing rules.274 First, the
Court sought to exercise a greater degree of judicial review over
267. Id. at ¶ 3.
268. See id. at ¶ 7; Craig & Deshpande, supra note 187, at 359.
269. See Craig & Deshpande, supra note 187, at 359.
270. See S.P. Gupta v. President of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365 (India).
271. Id. at ¶ 14.
272. See Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621 (India); see
generally Mullin v. Adm’r, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516 (India).
273. S.P. Gupta v. President of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365, ¶ 17 (India);
Cunningham, supra note 202, at 499 (internal citations omitted).
274. Craig & Deshpande, supra note 187, at 361.
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the actions of elected authorities. By adopting looser standing
rules, the Court enabled the public to hold authorities accountable to the judiciary and not simply to the “sweet will” of the
authorities themselves.275
A second and more innovative theme in the Court’s reasoning
is that standing rules had to be changed “because the very purpose of the law itself was undergoing a transformation. It was
being used to foster social justice by creating new categories of
rights.”276 This is closely linked to the simultaneous transformation in the Court’s interpretation of Article 21. Justice
Bhagwati explicitly made this connection in his S.P. Gupta
opinion. He noted that fundamental rights were “practically
meaningless . . . unless accompanied by social rights necessary
to make them effective and really accessible to all.”277 By “social rights,” Justice Bhagwati meant the directive principles in
Part IV of the Indian Constitution, which he believed were inextricably linked to the fundamental rights in Part III.278 This
is evident in the following passage:
More and more frequently the conferment of . . . socioeconomic rights and imposition of public duties on the State
and other authorities for taking positive action generates situations in which single human action can be beneficial or
prejudicial to a large number of people, thus making entirely
inadequate the traditional scheme of litigation as merely a
two-party affair. For example, the discharge of effluent in a
lake or river may harm all who want to enjoy its clean water;
emission of noxious gas may cause injury to large numbers of
people who inhale it along with the air, defective or unhealthy
packaging may cause damage to all consumers of goods and so
also illegal raising of railway or bus fares may affect the entire public which wants to use the railway or bus as a means
of transport.279

Thus, for Justice Bhagwati, the traditional model of litigation
was inadequate to protect the public interest from individual
acts that harmed large swathes of the population. He therefore
275. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
276. Id.
277. S.P. Gupta v. President of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365, ¶ 19 (India).
278. See id.; See INDIA CONST. art. 37; Craig & Deshpande, supra note 187,
at 361.
279. S.P. Gupta v. President of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365, ¶ 19 (India).
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gave an instrumental justification for liberalizing standing
rules—they permitted the Court to give broader (and, in
Bhagwati’s view, proper) meaning to Part III of the Constitution, by supplementing fundamental rights with directive principles.
Justice Bhagwati’s approach was enforced in Bandhua Mukti
Morcha v. Union of India (1984).280 Here, a public interest organization petitioned to eradicate bonded labor.281 Though Article 23 of the Indian Constitution prohibits forced labor, the
government argued that bonded labor did not violate any fundamental rights.282 Once again writing for the majority, Justice
Bhagwati dismissed this argument, relying primarily on the
right to life in Article 21.283 He reaffirmed that Article 21 protected the right to live with dignity, which included the right to
live free from exploitation.284 To support this broad interpretation, Justice Bhagwati drew on various directive principles (Articles 39, 41, and 42) that he said provided the “life breath” to
Article 21.285
Additionally, the Morcha case further entrenched the liberal
standing requirements adopted in the S.P. Gupta case—it allowed a nongovernmental organization (“NGO”) not directly
affected by bonded labor to bring a claim under Article 32.286
Justice Bhagwati even went so far as to suggest that PIL was
nonadversarial. In fact, he encouraged the government to “welcome public interest litigation because it would [allow the government] . . . to examine whether the poor and down-trodden
are getting their social and economic entitlements.”287 Justice
Bhagwati would later describe PIL as a sort of “collaborative”
litigation, where the petitioner, the government, and the Court
work together rather than as adversaries to determine the best
solutions to major social problems.288
280. See Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67 (India).
281. Id. at 102; Craig & Deshpande, supra note 187, at 362.
282. See Morcha, (1984) 2 S.C.R. at 103 (India).
283. See id.; Craig & Deshpande, supra note 187, at 362.
284. See Morcha, (1984) 2 S.C.R. at 103 (India).
285. Id.
286. Id.; Craig & Deshpande, supra note 187, at 362–63.
287. Morcha, (1984) 2 S.C.R at 103 (India).
288. Cunningham, supra note 202, at 504 (referencing Justice Bhagwati’s
interview with FRONTLINE).
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C. The Indian Judiciary Today: Judges as Policymakers
In the spirit of “collaborative” litigation, the Supreme Court
in Morcha and later cases devised further procedural innovations to give the judiciary a more substantial role in monitoring
and enforcing the implementation of judicial orders.289 The Supreme Court appoints special commissions to conduct factfinding, propose remedies, and monitor compliance with its orders.290 For instance, the Morcha Court appointed a special
commission to investigate facts on its behalf.291 The Commission was ordered to prepare a report of its findings that “would
furnish prima facie evidence of the facts and data . . . It would
be entirely for the Court to determine what weight to attach to
the facts and data.”292
Other procedural innovations of the Supreme Court include:
“epistolary jurisdiction”293 where courts treat a letter from a
state detainee or prisoner as a writ petition under Article 32;
and “continuing mandamus,” which, in cases like Morcha, allows the Court to enforce its orders on a continuous basis even
after litigation ends.294 Generally, the mechanism for enforcement is a series of interim orders, which allows the Court not
only to keep track of whether government schemes meet judicial guidelines, but also to instruct the government on how to
execute those schemes.295
An example of how closely the Court supervises the implementation of its orders is the ongoing “Right to Food” litigation.
In April 2001, the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (“PUCL”)
filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution
alleging that the Government of India, the Food Corporation of
289. See, e.g., Morcha, (1984) 2 S.C.R at 107 (India); Tellis v. Bombay Mun.
Corp., (1985) 2 S.C.R. Supp. 51 (India); PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India).
290. See, e.g., M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 S.C.R. 819, 829 (India); PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India).
291. See Morcha, (1984) 2 S.C.R at 105 (India).
292. Id. at 111–12; see also Cunningham, supra note 202, at 506.
293. See, e.g., S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365, 520-21; Sobraj v. Superintendent, Cent. Jail Tihar (1979) 1 S.C.R. 512 (India). See also,
Baxi, supra note 6, at 118; Dhavan, supra note 175, at 306–07.
294. See Morcha, (1984) 2 S.C.R at 71 (India).
295. See PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India); Birchfield & Corsi, supra note 26, at 699–701.
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India (“FCI”), and six state governments had violated the right
to life of millions of Indian citizens under Article 21.296 When
the petition was filed, India was experiencing a severe drought
leading to high rates of poverty and malnutrition.297 The petitioners argued that these government officials and the FCI had
failed to provide adequate food supplies and employment to the
affected population, which they were required to under the
Famine Code of 1962.298 According to petitioners, since adequate food is a necessary condition to sustain life, these state
actors had an affirmative duty to provide and distribute food to
citizens affected by the drought.299 This argument drew from
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 21 in Francis
Coralie, where it held that the right to life encompassed a right
to “live with dignity.”300
On November 28, 2001, the Supreme Court issued an interim
order recognizing certain food schemes as legal entitlements
under Article 21.301 It also gave the central and state governments specific orders on how to implement those schemes. For
instance, the Court instructed state governments “to complete
the identification of BPL [below poverty line] families, issuing
of cards and commencement of distribution of 25 kgs. grain per
family per month latest by 1st January, 2002.”302 Additionally,
it directed the central and state governments to provide “every
child in every Government and Government assisted Primary
Schools with a prepared mid day meal with a minimum content
296. PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India).
For an overview of and update on the right to food litigation, see RIGHT TO
FOOD CAMPAIGN, http://www.righttofoodindia.org/index.html (last visited Aug.
27, 2013).
297. See Colin Gonsalves et al., RIGHT TO FOOD: COMMISSIONS REPORTS,
SUPREME COURT ORDERS, NHRC REPORTS (2d ed. 2005) (reporting that in Rajasthan, one of the worst-affected states, 50% of children were malnourished
and half of the state’s population lived below the poverty line).
298. PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India);
Birchfield & Corsi, supra note 26, at 697–98.
299. See PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India).
300. Mullin v. Adm’r, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516, 529
(India).
301. See PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India)
(Nov.
28,
2001
interim
order),
available
at
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/nov28.html.
302. Id.
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of 300 calories and 8–12 grams of protein each day of school for
a minimum of 200 days.”303
In an interim order issued on May 2, 2003, the Court went
even further to engage in “something strikingly close to lawmaking.”304 To facilitate the proper distribution of grain supplies, the Court issued directions to the government on how to
regulate the issuance of licenses to distributors. These directions are formulated much like a statute would be. They require
(1) Licensees, who (a) do not keep their shops open throughout the month during the stipulated period, (b) fail to provide
grain to BPL families strictly at BPL rates and no higher, (c)
keep the cards of BPL households with them, (d) make false
entries in the BPL cards, (e) engage in black-marketing or siphoning away of grains to the open market and hand over
such ration shops to such other person/organizations, shall
make themselves liable for cancellation of their licenses. The
concerned authorities/functionaries would not show any laxity
on the subject.305

Today, more than a decade after it began, the “Right to Food”
litigation continues with the Court issuing regular interim orders directing the government how to implement its schemes
and instituting timelines for the completion of those
schemes.306 Over time, the litigation has grown to include all
Indian state governments as respondents.307 Its scope has also
expanded to cover a range of issues not directly related to the
right to food, including urban poverty, the right to work, and
even general issues of transparency and accountability in government implementation.308

303. Id.
304. Birchfield & Corsi, supra note 26, at 700. See PUCL v. Union of India,
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India) (May 2, 2003 interim order),
available at http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/may203.html.
305. PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India)
(May
2,
2003
interim
order),
available
at
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/may203.html.
306. See Birchfield & Corsi, supra note 26, at 699–701.
307. See A TOOL FOR ACTION, supra note 125, at 3 (2005).
308. Id. at 4.
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IV. JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING AND THE DEMOCRATIC OBJECTION
The judiciary, led by the Supreme Court, has transformed itself into a significant policymaking institution since the Constitution’s adoption in 1950. The effect of this transformation is
clear: the separation of powers framework set forth in the Constitution has been weakened. The Court has sought to replace
the division of powers among three branches of government
“with a ‘unitarian’ claim of formal judicial supremacy.”309
This supremacy emerged out of both substantive and procedural developments in the Indian Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. The directive principles in Part IV of the Constitution
were drafted as nonjusticiable guidelines, but have become justiciable rights under the right to “live with dignity” in Article
21.310 This has enabled the Supreme Court to adjudicate cases
pertaining to socioeconomic rights. The concurrent development of PIL led to relaxed standing rules, the appointment of
special commissions, and other procedural innovations that allow the Court to take on a greater range of cases and to craft
policy schemes that affect large numbers. Thus, PIL-related
procedural changes, combined with an expansive substantive
interpretation of the right to life, have fundamentally transformed the judiciary’s role under the Indian Constitution.
The “Right to Food” litigation exemplifies this transformation
and shows how the Supreme Court has become a major player
in formulating national socioeconomic policy. As of 2005, the
Court in that case had issued forty-four interim orders and appointed two Commissioners charged with “monitoring and reporting to this Court of the implementation by the respondents
of the various welfare measures and schemes.”311 This sort of
judicial policymaking calls forth a serious democratic objection.
The Court today constrains democratic decision making on a
wide range—and potentially indefinite—set of policy issues,

309. Mehta, supra note 6, at 72.
310. See Mullin v. Adm’r, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516 (India).
311. A TOOL FOR ACTION, supra note 125, at 7. The Supreme Court has
passed a number of interim orders since 2005. For a representative list, see
Legal Action: Supreme Court Orders, RIGHT TO FOOD CAMPAIGN
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/interimorders.html (last updated Feb.
28, 2013) [hereinafter Supreme Court Orders].
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leading many commentators to declare it the “most powerful
court in the world.”312
The Court’s role in Indian political life is difficult to square
with a Rawlsian liberal conception of democracy. It is important to note this conception does not necessarily envision a
strict separation of powers. In fact, Michelman does not rely on
(nor even accept) the standard separation of powers trope, in
which legislatures make policy choices without regard to law
and courts appear later to review the legality of legislative action.313 In fact, he argues that the democratic objection, which
grows out of this view, “trades on a particular, contestable and
indeed poor, conception of democracy.”314 Thus, society need not
accept this narrow conception of separation of powers or the
idea that norms should not be considered part of constitutional
law simply because they are not enforced by courts.315 In fact,
Michelman puts forth a different conception—one in which
constitutional law figures prominently in the “conduct of public
affairs,” constraining the acts of the executive and legislature.316
This view relies on a framing of socioeconomic guarantees as
directive principles guiding legislative action toward certain
societal goals, and not as judicially enforceable rights. Even if
courts are kept away from adjudicating socioeconomic rights,
there is still value in placing these rights within a Constitution. The value lies in a subtle but important effect that constitutional status confers—it would create a “certain pressure on
the frame of mind” of citizens and their representatives to consider principles of socioeconomic justice in their deliberations

312. Alexander Fischer, Higher Law Making as a Political Resource: Constitutional Amendments and the Constructive Fragmentation of Sovereignty in
India, in SOVEREIGNTY AND DIVERSITY 186 (Miodrag Jovanović & Kristin Henrard eds. 2008) (pointing out that both Upendra Baxi and S. P. Sathe have
referred to the Indian Supreme Court as the “most powerful in the world”);
Sathe, supra note 187, at 89 (“None of the political players have protested
against judicial intrusion into matters that essentially belonged to the executive. Some feeble whispers are heard, but they are from those whose vested
interests are adversely affected.”).
313. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 33.
314. Id. at 39.
315. Id. at 33.
316. Id.
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and public policy decisions.317 These principles would not overly
constrain democratic policymaking but give a “certain inflection to political public reason.”318
This is exactly what the framers of the Indian Constitution
had in mind when they separated fundamental rights from directive principles and explicitly made the latter nonjusticiable.319 However, the Indian judiciary, led by the Supreme
Court, fundamentally altered the original Constitutional
framework. The “Right to Food” litigation illustrates at least
three ways in which the Supreme Court increased its own power and decision-making influence.
First, as a result of its expansive reading of Article 21, the
Court can enforce a greater number of rights than it could in
the early years of the republic. When the Court first declared a
right to “live with dignity,” it stated that it included “the bare
necessities of life such as . . . nutrition, clothing, and shelter”
over the head.320 However, the Court placed no limiting principle on this right,321 and this interpretation grows ever more expansive over time. The “Right to Food” litigation is emblematic
of that growth—it began as a case about the supply and distribution of food to famine-affected populations, but now encompasses issues of homelessness, maternity, and child development.322
In another recent case, the Supreme Court declared that even
the “right to sleep” falls within the ambit of Article 21. According to the Court, “[s]leep is essential . . . to maintain the delicate balance of health necessary for its very existence and survival.”323 Adequate sleep is therefore an important aspect of

317. Id. at 39.
318. Id.
319. See INDIA CONST. art. 37; see supra Part II.
320. Mullin v. Adm’r, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516, 529
(India).
321. See id.
322. See A TOOL FOR ACTION, supra note 125, at 4; Supreme Court Orders,
supra note 311 (listing interim orders on homelessness, the National Maternity Benefit Scheme, and the Integrated Child Development Scheme).
323. In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident Dt. 4/5.06.2011 v. Home Sec’y, Union of
India, 2012 STPL (Web) 124 S.C. (India) at 76 [hereinafter Right to Sleep
Case],
available
at
http://www.stplindia.in/SCJFiles/2012_STPL(Web)_124_SC.pdf.
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human dignity “without which the existence of life itself would
be in peril.”324
Cases like this suggest that the right to “live with dignity”
has potentially infinite scope. It calls to mind W.E. Forbath’s
right to “social citizenship” that would provide assurances to all
citizens that they can make a decent living through forms of
social participation that provide the opportunity for selfimprovement, material interdependence, and security for all.325
As Michelman noted, such a broadly conceived right would
leave “no leading [political] issue . . . untouched.”326 This is the
core of the democratic objection—when constitutional rights
are couched in some of the widest imaginable terms, as they
are by the Indian Supreme Court, the Constitution unduly restricts democratic decision making on a range of issues.327
By contrast, the South African Constitution couches its socioeconomic rights in much narrower terms. It includes judicially
enforceable rights to a clean environment, housing, food, water,
social security, and education.328 Faced with this finite, enumerated list of socioeconomic rights, the South African Constitutional Court is much more constrained than its Indian counterpart. For instance, it could not recognize a “right to sleep.”
Moreover, with regard to the rights to housing, food, water, and
social security, the South African Court requires only that the
government take reasonable measures toward the progressive
realization of these rights for all citizens.329 The Indian Supreme Court, however, is not so constrained—it has not set
forth a clear standard of review for socioeconomic policies, giving it a greater license to intervene as it sees fit.
A second way in which the Indian Supreme Court has increased its influence on socioeconomic policy is through new,
accommodating procedural requirements under Article 32, including “epistolary jurisdiction” and relaxed standing rules.
324. Id.; see also Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom,
39 UCLA L. REV. 295 (1991–1992) (making the case that homelessness,
which deprives individuals of adequate sleep, constitutes a deprivation of
human dignity and freedom).
325. See Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights, supra note 116, at 1827.
326. Michelman, supra note 2, at 33.
327. See id. at 30–33.
328. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 24, 26, 27, 29.
329. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 31; S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 26, 27.
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This has transformed the Court into a forum where social
movements, led by NGOs, can voice their grievances on behalf
of large segments of the population, and in the process, obtain
relief against the government. As Upendra Baxi put it, “People
now know that the Court has constitutional power of intervention, which can be invoked to ameliorate their miseries.”330
For example, take the “Right to Food” litigation; PUCL, an
NGO, filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution on
behalf of thousands affected by famine, even though the NGO
was not itself directly affected.331 Over time, the case expanded
to include all Indian states as respondents,332 meaning that the
Supreme Court’s interim orders could potentially impact all
Indian citizens.
Finally, a third and related means toward greater policymaking authority for the Indian Supreme Court is a series of procedural innovations; this includes the continuing mandamus and
the appointment of special commissions that enable it to monitor compliance with its orders. The “Right to Food” litigation
has continued for more than eleven years, with the Court having issued forty-four interim orders by 2005 and several more
since then.333 More strikingly, the Court instructed both central
and state governments on how to allocate resources under various socioeconomic policy schemes and instituted timelines for
their completion.334 The Court also appointed special commissioners to monitor and report whether government actors are
complying with the Court’s orders.335
Together, these developments illustrate the judiciary’s rise as
a policymaking institution and call forth a serious democratic
objection. The fact that socioeconomic rights are couched in
very broad terms under Article 21 is problematic in the Indian
context, but need not be per se. For instance, say the Indian
330. Baxi, supra note 6, at 108.
331. See PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India).
332. See A TOOL FOR ACTION, supra note 125, at 4.
333. See id. at 4–7; Supreme Court Orders, supra note 311 (listing several
recent interim orders).
334. PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India)
(May
2,
2003
interim
order),
available
at
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/may203.html.
335. See A TOOL FOR ACTION, supra note 125, at 4–7.
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Supreme Court continued to locate a number of rights within
the right to “live with dignity,” but instead of formulating and
enforcing its own policy prescriptions to remedy violations of
those rights, it simply held government policies to a reasonableness standard. In this scenario, a “constitutionally declared
right . . . of social citizenship would leave just about every major issue of public policy still to be decided.”336 This would mitigate (if not eliminate) the democratic objection, as the court
would leave it to the elected branches of government to make
socioeconomic policy and would confine itself to simply judging
the constitutionality of those policies under a relatively lenient
standard of review. This is the approach adopted by the South
African Constitutional Court.337 Compared to South Africa, socioeconomic rights in India have been couched in very broad
and obtuse terms by the Indian Supreme Court. The Court has
not specified or placed any limiting principle on the rights that
could be inferred under the “right to live with dignity.” It has
also failed to establish a standard to review government socioeconomic policies.338 Together, these developments give the
Court wide latitude to shape socioeconomic policy at the expense of democratic deliberation and compromise. Going forward, the Indian Supreme Court would lessen the democratic
objection if it were to clearly prescribe limits on the “right to
live with dignity” and set forth a standard of review for socioeconomic policy schemes. However, this seems unlikely in light of
judicially-created procedural innovations at every stage of litigation that have allowed the Court to transform itself into a
policymaking institution capable of affecting change on a large
scale.339 As the “Right to Food” litigation shows, the Indian Su-

336. Michelman, supra note 2, at 39.
337. See, e.g., Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46
(CC) (S. Afr.).
338. See Mehta, supra note 6, at 72 (“[E]ven as the Supreme Court has established itself as a forum for resolving public-policy problems, the principles
informing its actions have become less clear.”); KHOSLA, THE INDIAN
CONSTITUTION, supra note 191, at 129 (arguing that the Supreme Court has
adopted neither a “minimum core” or reasonableness standard, but instead
operates on a “conditional social rights model” that examines only the implementation of government schemes, not their content).
339. See Cunningham, supra note 202, at 522–23 (“[V]olunteer social activists are allowed standing, a simple letter can be accepted as a writ petition,
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preme Court, unlike its South African counterpart, does not
simply declare government socioeconomic policy schemes unconstitutional, but issues specific directions for how to fix those
schemes that it enforces with interim orders.340 In light of
Michelman’s proposed solution to the democratic objection—to
move beyond courts and toward representative democracy informed by directive principles and constrained by public reason—the Indian Supreme Court’s approach of first locating socioeconomic rights in the Constitution and then vigorously enforcing them is democratically problematic.
Nevertheless, drawing from Rawls, even the Court’s strong
exercise of judicial review is perhaps defensible “given certain
historical circumstances and conditions of political culture” in
India.341 While Rawls did not elaborate on what he meant here,
he suggests that the need for judicial review (and perhaps also
its scope) varies among societies based on “justice-related concerns.”342 Thus, even in its strongest form, judicial review
might be justified where the elected branches of government do
not provide citizens with a “social minimum,”343 or violate the
“difference principle” by failing to distribute resources to the
greatest benefit of a society’s least-privileged members.344
A full discussion of the history and politics of socioeconomic
justice in India is beyond the scope of this Article,345 but one’s
initial impression is that judicial review might be justified in
light of certain facts. Historically, India has struggled with
chronic poverty and malnourishment, which have not improved
much over time.346 This lack of improvement is widely attribut-

the court itself will . . . [establish] the facts through commissions, and whenever possible the case will move swiftly to the issue of remedy.”).
340. See A TOOL FOR ACTION, supra note 125, at 4–7.
341. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 240.
342. Michelman, Justice as Fairness, supra note 93, at 1413.
343. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 166, 228–29 (providing that the state must provide a “social minimum” providing for satisfaction
of citizens’ “basic” material needs to the extent required for them to take effective part in political and social life).
344. See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 49–52.
345. For a comprehensive overview, see C.J. NIRMAL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INDIA: HISTORICAL, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES (2002).
346. See Dreze, supra note 30, at 1723 (noting that a 1998–1999 study
found that 47% of all Indian children were undernourished and 52% of all
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ed to rampant corruption at all levels of government.347 Studies
on the right to food and the right to health have concluded that
government schemes in these areas have failed because of bribery, rent seeking, and other corrupt practices.348
With respect to the right to food, the Supreme Court appointed a Committee headed by former Justice Wadhwa to investigate the Public Distribution System (“PDS”). The PDS was initiated to ensure that adequate food reached poorer segments of
Indian society at subsidized prices. The Committee, however,
found that most of the food released at subsidized rates never
reaches its intended recipients.349 It concluded that the impact
of the PDS is “virtually non-existent on the ground and as a
result, malpractices abound to the great discomfiture of the
common man.”350
Thus, the elected branches do not effectively provide a social
minimum for many of its citizens, nor a just system of distribution. At first glance, then, historical circumstances and political
conditions in India appear to justify the Supreme Court’s robust exercise of judicial review, even though it has increasingly
limited democratic decision making.
More fundamentally, such dysfunction in representative government calls into question the institutional assumptions on
which the democratic objection is based. As David Landau argues, the idea that the legislature should operate in a separate
adult women were anemic); id. at 1728 (positing that the “improvement of
nutrition indicators over time is very slow”).
347. See C. RAJ KUMAR, CORRUPTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDIA 2–3 (2011)
(arguing that corruption in India “undermines the very social fabric, and the
political and bureaucratic structure of the Indian society . . . [it] violates the
constitutional foundations of Indian democracy”).
348. On the right to food, see JUSTICE WADHWA COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE
PUBLIC
DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM,
available
at
http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Food%20Security/Justice%20Wadhwa
%20Committee%20Report%20on%20PDS.pdf
[hereinafter
WADHWA
COMMITTEE REPORT]. On the right to health, see R. Huss et al., Good Governance and Corruption in the Health Sector: Lessons from the Karnataka Experience, 26 HEALTH POL. & PLANNING 471 (2011). See also Susan RoseAckerman, The Political Economy for Corruption, INST. FOR INT’L ECON.,
available at iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/12/2iie2334.pdf.
349. See WADHWA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 348.
350. Executive Summary, CENTRAL VIGILENCE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM
(Aug.
17,
2007),
available
at
http://pdscvc.nic.in/Executive%20Summary-17Aug2007.htm.
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space from the judiciary assumes, inter alia, that the legislature is responsive to popular will, attuned to constitutional
values, and has greater capacity than the judiciary—
assumptions that do not apply in developing countries like India.351 The judiciary’s role therefore should be judged in its institutional context. In India, this means accepting that the judiciary acts as a political institution that gains democratic legitimacy by exercising policymaking as well as judicial power.352
V. THE CONTRACTARIAN OBJECTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL
SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS IN INDIA
The Indian Supreme Court has assumed an increasingly
prominent role in the formulation and enforcement of socioeconomic policy through both substantive and procedural shifts in
its jurisprudence. But has it set forth publicly acceptable reasons to justify its decisions to relax procedural requirements
under Article 32 of the Constitution and to make socioeconomic
rights justiciable under Article 21? This is the central question
posed by the contractarian objection. It shifts our focus from
the Court’s role in India’s constitutional framework to the legitimacy of its decision-making process.
The contractarian objection begins with the premise that a
constitution’s legitimacy requires, at a minimum, that rational
citizens (acting reasonably) understand its terms and can agree
to be governed by them.353 If citizens cannot understand the
terms or are unable to determine if their government or fellow
citizens are complying with constitutional principles, they will
not regard the constitution as a legitimate source of political
authority.354
To put this objection in the context of socioeconomic rights,
recall that Rawls clearly differentiates between the first principle of justice that sets out a scheme of basic liberties that are
“constitutionally essential,” and the second principle, which
351. See generally David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in
Comparative Constitutional Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 319 (2010).
352. See UPENDRA BAXI, THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT AND POLITICS 10–30
(1979).
353. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 35.
354. See id. at 36.
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pertains to non-constitutionally essential questions of social
and economic policy.355 A constitutional system can be legitimate if it complies with a range of basic liberties, but nonetheless unjust for failing to pursue socioeconomic justice.356
While the second principle is not constitutionally essential, it
nonetheless pertains to what Rawls calls “basic justice” and is
therefore governed by the constraint of public reason.357 This
requires citizens and their public institutions to present each
other with publicly acceptable reasons for their political views,
to be willing to listen to others, and to display “fair-mindedness
in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made.”358
The constraint of public reason applies more stringently to
the Supreme Court.359 In many democratic societies, including
India’s, the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of constitutional
interpretation. Its justices must articulate the best interpretation of the Constitution through reasoned opinions that are
grounded in political values that reflect their best understanding of the public conception of justice.360 Unlike ordinary citizens or their elected representatives who deliberate on a range
of policy issues, the justices are concerned with the higher
(constitutional) law and matters of basic justice, and therefore
must only use public reasons to explain their decisions.361 The
need for the Court to explain its decisions through public reasons is heightened with regard to socioeconomic rights. These
rights “lack the trait of transparency,” as it is difficult to measure if they are being realized at any given moment.362 This lack
of transparency accounts for one of the primary distinctions
between the first and second principles. Rawls believes that in
comparison to the second principle, “it is far easier to tell

355. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 46.
356. See Michelman, Justice as Fairness, supra note 93, at 1414.
357. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 214; see Michelman,
supra note 2, at 37–38.
358. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 217.
359. See id. at 216, 231.
360. Id. at 236.
361. See id. at 216, 234.
362. Michelman, supra note 2, at 36.
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whether . . . [Constitutional] essentials are realized.”363 He
states that the realization of the second principle is “always
open to reasonable differences of opinion . . . [it] depend[s] on
inference and judgment in assessing complex social and economic information.”364 Thus, Rawls argues that the first principle should apply “at the stage of the constitutional convention,”
while issues of socioeconomic justice should be decided by
elected representatives after the basic constitutional structure
is in place.365 In essence, this is the structure adopted by the
framers of the Indian Constitution. They set forth a scheme of
basic liberties in Part III of the Constitution, followed by nonjusticiable Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV.366 The
Indian Supreme Court altered this constitutional structure by
interpreting Articles 21 and 32 to make socioeconomic rights
justiciable and allow the Court to assume a central role in their
enforcement.
As the “exemplar of public reason,” the Supreme Court’s decisions must reasonably comport with the text of the Constitution, constitutional precedents, and political understandings of
the Constitution to articulate “a coherent constitutional view
over the whole range of their decisions.”367 If its decisions do
not meet these criteria, citizens might lose confidence that public reason applies to decisions of socioeconomic justice and the
“extant system of positive legal ordering is unjust.”368 More
broadly, if citizens cannot understand what constitutionally
essential provisions require, they will doubt the legitimacy of
the whole constitutional system.369

363. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 49. See also Michelman,
Poverty in Liberalism, supra note 72, at 1016 (“It is more urgent, Rawls proposes, to settle constitutionally the framework of ‘just political procedure’—in
which he includes guaranteed personal and political liberties—than it is to
settle matters of economic justice, fairness, and distribution. And that is all
the more so, he adds, given the relative non-transparency of judgment regarding satisfaction of that latter part of justice.”).
364. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 48.
365. See id. at 48.
366. See INDIA CONST. §§ 12–51; AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, supra
note 20, at 50–83.
367. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 231, 234–36.
368. Michelman, supra note 2, at 38.
369. See id.
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With respect to Article 32, the Court’s decisions appear to fit
within the constraint of public reason. As a preliminary matter,
the text of Article 32 sets forth a flexible standard rather than
a fixed rule that allows the Court some interpretive discretion.370 It states that citizens may petition the Supreme Court
via “appropriate proceedings” to obtain relief for violations of
fundamental rights.371 As discussed in Part III, supra, the term
“appropriate proceedings” originally limited standing to petitioners directly affected by a challenged law. Yet, over time the
Court loosened this requirement to accommodate petitions
from any member of the public on behalf of disadvantaged individuals or groups.372 This interpretation is within the bounds
of public reason because the phrase “appropriate proceedings”
clearly sets forth a standard rather than a rule. All mainstream theories of constitutional interpretation, with the exception of what Jack Balkin calls “original expected application,”373 would accept that the phrase “appropriate proceedings”
can (or even should) evolve over time.374
The Court is also quite clear in its reasoning on this question
of interpretation. For instance, in Bandhua Mukti Morcha,
Justice Bhagwati states,
There is no limitation in regard to the kind of proceeding envisaged in clause (1) of Article 32 except that the proceeding
must be “appropriate” and this requirement of appropriateness must be judged in the light of the purpose for which the

370. See INDIA CONST. art. 32.
371. Id.
372. See generally Craig & Deshpande, supra note 187; Cunningham, supra
note 202.
373. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 6–7 (2011). For an example of this
sort of originalism, see generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
374. See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 373, at 7 (“When the
Constitution uses vague standards or abstract principles, we must apply
them to our own circumstances in our own time.”); DAVID STRAUSS, THE
LIVING CONSTITUTION 8 (2010) (“[Some] provisions of the Constitution, while
written in plain enough English, do not give us . . . unequivocal instructions.”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism
and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 378 (2007) (noting that some
constitutional provisions are “open ended and invite constitutional decisionmaking that expresses national ideals”).
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proceeding is to be taken, namely, enforcement of a fundamental right.375

He goes on to state that the framers “did not lay down any particular form of proceeding . . . nor did they stipulate that such
proceeding should conform to any rigid pattern or straight
jacket,” since this would be “self-defeating because it would
place enforcement of fundamental rights beyond the reach of
the common man.”376 This justification depends on the very
plausible premise that the framers knew that an open-ended
provision was necessary in “a country like India, where there is
so much of poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, deprivation and exploitation.”377
Justice Bhagwati also described the changing nature of litigation, where “Public Interest litigation is not in the nature of
adversary litigation but it is a challenge and an opportunity to
the government.”378 Here, Justice Bhagwati defends the Court’s
evolving interpretation of Article 32 on the grounds that “appropriate proceedings” should be interpreted according to the
purpose of the litigation in question, and the purpose of public
interest litigation, particularly in a country like India, is to allow ordinary citizens to approach the Court to hold the government accountable on matters of social justice.
While this justification does not lessen (and might even reinforce) the democratic objection,379 it overcomes the contractarian objection. The Court has interpreted Article 32 in a manner
consistent with the text that recognizes the framers’ broader
goals of social revolution,380 as well as the real need for PIL in
India. This fulfills the constraint of public reason: the Court’s
reasoning is transparent, clearly articulated, and is accessible
to all Indian citizens in light of their own reasons.381
The Court’s reasoning with regard to Article 21 is more problematic. The Court has interpreted the right to life expansively
375. Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R 67, (India).
376. Id.; See also Craig & Deshpande, supra note 187, at 364 (“The justification given by Bhagwati, J for reading Article 32 in this manner is clear and
forthright.”).
377. Morcha, (1984) 2 S.C.R at 71 (India).
378. Id.
379. See supra Part IV.
380. See AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 26–27, 50.
381. See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 17, at 90–91.
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to include a right to “live with dignity,” which includes a range
of socioeconomic rights.382 However, the structure of the Indian
Constitution clearly demarcates fundamental rights in Part III
and directive principles in Part IV. More importantly, Article
37 of the Constitution states that directive principles “shall not
be enforceable by any court” even though these principles are
“fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be
the duty of the State to apply these principles in making
laws.”383 Unlike Article 32, which uses a flexible standard, Article 37 sets forth a clear rule. The text of Article 37 is unambiguous and does not permit any deviation. Indeed, no major
theory of constitutional interpretation would endorse a judicial
interpretation of a bright-line rule that deviates from the plain
meaning of the language of the text.384
The Indian Supreme Court therefore has a heavy burden in
justifying its deviation from the text of Article 37. In the seminal cases that transformed the meaning of Article 21 into a
broader right to live with dignity, the Court’s reasoning is inadequate—it either sidesteps or completely ignores the clear
textual command of Article 37.
In Maneka Gandhi, which first set out a broader interpretation of Article 21, the Court included substantial dicta about
the right to life without providing any justification for these
pronouncements. It says, for instance, that fundamental rights
in Part III of the Constitution “represent the basic values cher382. See Mullin v. Adm’r, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516 (India).
383. INDIA CONST. art. 37.
384. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Fidelity to Text and Principle, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 12 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009)
(“The Constitution’s text contains determinate rules (the president must be
thirty-five, there are two houses of Congress), standards (no ‘unreasonable
searches and seizures,’ a right to a ‘speedy’ trial), and principles (‘freedom of
speech,’ ‘equal protection’) . . . Adopters use fixed rules because they want to
limit discretion.”); STRAUSS, supra note 374, at 7 (“Many provisions . . . are
quite precise and leave no room for quarreling, or for fancy questions about
interpretation.”); Post & Siegel, supra note 374, at 378 (“There may be constitutional provisions of which it can be said . . . that ‘an important—perhaps
the important—function of law is its ability to settle authoritatively what is
to be done.’”) (quoting Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1377 (1997) (emphasis in original)).
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ished by the people of this country since the Vedic times and
they are calculated to protect the dignity of the individual and
create conditions in which every human being can develop his
personality to the fullest extent.”385
It then builds on these broad assertions in Francis Coralie,
proclaiming that the right to life
includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes
along with it, namely, the bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading,
writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving
about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings.386

As with the excerpt from Maneka Gandhi, this definition of the
right to life appears to be invented out of whole cloth, without
reference to any precedent, constituent assembly debate, or
other source of law. Moreover, both the Maneka Gandhi and
the Francis Coralie decisions fail even to mention Article 37,
much less explain how the Court got past the plain meaning of
Article 37 when it reinterpreted Article 21 to make socioeconomic rights justiciable.387
Justice Bhagwati provided some hints as to the Court’s reasoning on this issue in the Bandhua Mukti Morcha case. First,
he acknowledges that directive principles “are not enforceable
in a court of law,” and the Court therefore cannot compel the
government to pass laws or executive orders to meet socioeconomic goals.388 Still, he adds that if the state has already
passed legislation impacting socioeconomic justice, state actors
“can certainly be obligated to ensure observance of such legislation for inaction on the part of the State in securing implementation of such legislation would amount to denial of the right to
live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21.”389
The distinction drawn here is illusory. Article 37 does not
merely state that courts cannot compel the state to pass laws
385. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621, 627 (India).
386. Mullin v. Adm’r, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516, 518
(India).
387. See Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621 (India) See
generally Mullin v. Adm’r, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516 (India).
388. Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67, 103 (India).
389. Id.
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or orders; it flatly prohibits the enforcement of directive principles. Justice Bhagwati does not put forth evidence to support
his view that Article 37 is not intended to apply to judicial review of existing laws. Further, even if the Court is permitted to
review existing laws affecting socioeconomic policy, it has never
clearly stated (in this case or otherwise) exactly to what standard the government is held.390 Additionally, as the “Right to
Food” litigation demonstrates, the Court does not confine itself
to a “reasonableness” or “minimum core” standard, but actually
imposes its own policy prescriptions and timelines for completion on elected officials.391
Justice Bhagwati’s opinion in Bandhua Mukti Morcha also
states that certain directive principles (Articles 39, 41, and 42)
provide Article 21 with its “life breath.”392 These articles direct
the state to secure, inter alia, a fair economic system, adequate
livelihood, education, public health access, and humane working conditions for all citizens.393 According to Justice Bhagwati,
these principles constitute “the minimum requirements which
must exist in order to enable a person to live with human dignity.”394 The Court therefore implies a degree of interplay between Parts III and IV of the Constitution. It uses the directive
principles to determine the scope and meaning of fundamental
rights. Thus, Part IV of the Constitution is not justiciable on its
own, but plays an important role in defining what the “right to
life” encompasses.395
This reasoning is flawed in light of the clear language in Article 37 prohibiting courts from enforcing directive principles.
390. See generally id.; Mehta, supra note 6, at 74 (“The Court has helped
itself to so much power . . . without explaining from whence its own authority
is supposed to come.”); Cunningham, supra note 202, at 512 (noting that in
several cases the Court has granted relief to petitioners and issued specific
directions to the government before deciding whether it has jurisdiction).
391. See PUCL v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 (2001) (India).
392. Morcha, (1984) 2 S.C.R at 103 (India).
393. See INDIA CONST. arts. 39, 41, 42.
394. Morcha, (1984) 2 S.C.R at 103 (India).
395. See Craig & Deshpande, supra note 187, at 366 (“Part IV becomes of
seminal importance in determining the more precise meaning which . . . [fundamental] rights should have when concrete specification has to be given concerning their enforcement. The judicial approach therefore rejects any rigid
division between liberty and the worth of liberty.”).
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Rather than enforcing them directly, the Supreme Court essentially sidesteps this provision by enforcing the directive principles through a right to “live with dignity” in Article 21. Moreover, the Court does not place any limits on the scope of this
right. While the Francis Coralie case lists only a few rights, including the rights to adequate nutrition, food, and shelter,396
the Court has since inferred that Article 21 protects the right
to education,397 the right to a clean environment,398 and even
rights that do not appear in the directive principles, such as
the right to sleep.399
Through its disregard for the text of Article 37 and its capacious interpretation of Article 21, the Indian Supreme Court
renders important Constitutional provisions inscrutable to Indian citizens. However, this contractarian objection was not
inevitable. The Indian Supreme Court could have avoided this
result by producing well-reasoned and circumscribed judgments. As discussed earlier, South Africa does not face this
problem because its constitutional court is limited to enforcing
clearly defined, narrowly couched socioeconomic rights that are
enumerated in the South African Constitution.400 The Indian
Constitution, by contrast, lists directive principles that are explicitly nonjusticiable under Article 37. The Indian Supreme
Court has not explained how it moved past Article 37’s plain
meaning. There is no articulated standard of judicial review or
limit to the scope of the right to life under Article 21. The Court
therefore fails to meet the constraint of public reason in its
judgments on socioeconomic rights.
The right to “live with dignity” is indeterminate; any number
of positive entitlements might be deemed essential to human
dignity, and any government policy in this area might be ruled
unconstitutional for reasons that rational and reasonable citizens could not discern or predict with any certainty. Thus, citizens may no longer accept the Constitution as a legitimate
source of political authority.

396. See Mullin v. Adm’r, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516, 518
(India).
397. See Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 S.C.R. 594, 719 (India).
398. See RLEK v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 2426 (India).
399. See Right to Sleep Case, supra note 323, at 76.
400. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 24, 26, 27, 29.
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CONCLUSION: TOWARD A BROADER CONCEPTION OF LEGITIMACY
Since the adoption of the Indian Constitution in 1950, the judiciary, led by the Supreme Court, has greatly increased its
policymaking authority. The Court not only expanded the
meaning of Article 21 to make socioeconomic rights justiciable
under the Constitution, but also oversaw several modifications
to fundamental rights litigation under Article 32.401 Three significant changes emerge from the Court’s approach: (1) the judiciary can enforce a greater number of rights; (2) through relaxed standing rules, public interest groups and concerned citizens may file petitions under Article 32; and (3) courts have
become significant players in formulating and enforcing socioeconomic policy. The first change is substantive, the latter two
are procedural.
This Article has set forth two objections to these changes. The
democratic objection arises from the Court’s transformation
into a policymaking institution such that there is potentially no
issue of public policy that it cannot reach or government
scheme that it cannot review. The contractarian objection is
narrower—it asks whether the reasons put forward by the
Court to justify its decisions on socioeconomic rights meet the
constraint of public reason.
The Article’s theoretical framework offers at least two major
benefits as a lens through which to examine socioeconomic
rights in India. First, it distinguishes between two sorts of critiques: (1) those pertaining to the Supreme Court’s role in India’s constitutional framework, and (2) those involving the
Court’s substantive interpretation of the Constitution and the
resulting problem with legitimacy. This distinction is potentially useful in light of the current literature in this area. While
some scholars elide this distinction by criticizing the Supreme
Court’s policymaking role in terms of legitimacy,402 others focus
only on the democratic objection.403

401. See generally Craig & Deshpande, supra note 187; Cunningham, supra
note 202.
402. See, e.g., Mehta, supra note 6, at 71–72, 79–82 (discussing both the rise
of PIL and the “legitimacy of judicial intervention” as part of the same phenomenon); Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in
India: Attempting the Impossible, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495, 509 (1989).
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The democratic objection implicates both the substantive and
procedural changes described above, as the Court today does
not simply adjudicate on a greater number of issues, but has
become the central forum for social movements and public interest organizations to affect far-reaching policy changes with
regard to socioeconomic justice.404
The contractarian objection, though, forces us to distinguish
among the substantive and procedural changes in the Court’s
jurisprudence. While all three changes contribute to the democratic objection, the contractarian objection only arises in response to substantive changes—namely, the Court’s broad
reading of Article 21 (and disregard for Article 37) to make socioeconomic rights justiciable. As discussed, the Court’s interpretation of Article 21 is not justified by the text or clearly explained in the Court’s opinions and therefore fails to meet the
constraint of public reason.
However, the procedural changes are not problematic from a
contractarian perspective. The Court’s expansive interpretation
of Article 32 is reasonable under this provision’s open-ended
language. The Court’s decisions to allow a wider class of citizens to file writ petitions, to allow special commissions to undertake fact-finding, or to empower courts to issue and enforce
detailed interim orders are also explained with clear and publicly accessible reasons. Thus, while many look at these substantive and procedural changes as coterminous elements within the broader development of PIL, the contractarian view
shows that they are distinct in this important respect.
A second benefit of this Article’s theoretical framework is
that it steps back from analyzing the political effects of SuThe court has been charged not only with exceeding its institutional
capacity, but with reversing constitutional priorities, usurping both
legislative and administrative functions, violating the rule of law,
riding roughshod over traditional rights and succumbing to the corrupting temptations of power. Such criticisms are ordinarily couched
in the language of legitimacy.
Id.
403. See, e.g., Khosla, supra note 214, at 56–57 (noting that while the term
“judicial activism has become commonplace in evaluations of the Court’s
functioning” and has spawned a “wide-ranging body of literature,” this literature has not effectively engaged with what “judicial activism” means).
404. See Baxi, supra note 6, at 107–11.
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preme Court judgments to examine the process of the Court’s
decision making. The current academic literature on socioeconomic rights under the Indian Constitution is concerned primarily with the effects of Supreme Court judgments on, inter
alia, the Court’s legitimacy, India’s separation of powers
framework, and Indian society at large.405 Those who defend
the Court’s exercise of judicial review have relied on the failure
of elected representatives to improve socioeconomic conditions
to justify the Court’s intervention into matters of policy.406
Others, echoing the democratic objection, have criticized what
they believe is the judiciary’s usurpation of legislative and executive authority.407 Their disagreement appears to rest on di405. See, e.g., Mehta, supra note 6, at 80 (“What legitimizes judicial activism and makes it an exertion not of mere power, but of just authority? One
possible answer is that judicial activism is justified to the extent that it helps
to preserve democratic institutions and values.”); Sathe, supra note 187, at
88–89 (arguing that the Supreme Court “is not equipped with the skills and
the competence to discharge functions that essentially belong to other coordinate bodies of government. Its institutional equipment is inadequate for undertaking legislative or administrative functions.”); Sripati, supra note 6, at
135 (“The Court’s crucial directives to the government and appointment of
individuals as commissions of enquiry enhance the political visibility of human rights violations, serve to ignite effective legislative action, raise public
consciousness and create opportunities for individuals and institutions to
make meaningful contributions for the realization of constitutional values.”).
406. See, e.g., Upendra Baxi, Judicial Discourse: Dialectics of the Face and
the Mask, 35 J. INDIAN L. INST. 1, 12 (1993) (characterizing judicial activism
as “a struggle for the recovery of the Indian Constitution” and arguing that
forceful judicial intervention had led to accountability in governance).
I do not mean . . . to suggest that the Supreme Court is the sole
agency to safeguard and advance human rights in a democratic society like India . . . it is nonetheless a crucial agency, sometimes perhaps—in the light of a corrupt and an errant executive, an irresponsible Parliament—a virtually indispensable one for the protection of
human rights in India.
Sripati, supra note 6, at 135–36.
407. See, e.g., Sathe, supra note 187, at 88 (“After surveying Indian Supreme Court caselaw, we arrive at the conclusion that the Court has clearly
transcended the limits of the judicial function and has undertaken functions
which really belong to either the legislature or the executive.”); SRI KRISHNA
AGRAWALA, PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA 37 (1986).
India being a welfare state, legislation already exists on most matters . . . If the Court states enforcing all such legislation under the
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vergent views as to the appropriate role of the judiciary in a
democratic society—views that probably cannot be reconciled.
Even from the Rawlsian perspective, it is open to interpretation whether the Indian Supreme Court’s robust use of judicial
review is justified in Indian society, though a strong case can
be mounted for the Court in light of historical and political circumstances.408
By looking at the Supreme Court’s decisions on socioeconomic
rights through the lens of public reason, this Article has focused on whether the Court’s decision-making process is worthy of acceptance by Indian citizens. And, in short, it might not
be worthy: the Court fails to provide clear and transparent reasons to justify its interpretations of Articles 21 and 37.409 As a
result, Indian citizens could not understand constitutionally
essential provisions with any clarity or conviction, which might
prevent them from assenting to be governed under this Constitution. The Court’s judgments in this area therefore threaten
the legitimacy of the present constitutional order.
This article’s claim that the legitimacy of the Indian constitutional order is threatened by the Supreme Court’s enforcement
of socioeconomic rights might appear counterintuitive. After
all, it seems to conflict with the fact that the Court is one of the
few Indian public institutions that shows the will and the capacity to actually improve the lot of the least privileged mem-

spacious plea that non-enforcement is violative of article 21, perhaps
no state activity can be spared from the purview of the Supreme
Court as a PIL matter. Its logical extension could mean the taking
over of the total administration of the country from the executive by
the Court.
Id.
408. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 7, at 240; see supra Part
IV.
409. Interestingly, Supreme Court justices have invoked Rawls outside the
socioeconomic rights context to justify broad rights-based constitutional interpretations and judicial intervention. See, e.g., Soshit v. Union of India, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 185 (India) (Reddy, J., concurring) (relying on the “Difference Principle” to argue in favor of preferential treatment for Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Railway Administration); State of U.P. v.
Bisht, (2007) 6 S.C.C. 586 (India) (Sinha, J., concurring) (invoking public reason in a consumer protection dispute to argue against judicial restraint and
for a greater role for the Court in this area).
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bers of society.410 The Supreme Court enjoys widespread support among Indian citizens who approach the Court in large
numbers to obtain various sorts of relief against the government.411 The public also views the judiciary as one of the least
corrupt state institutions.412 Moreover, Supreme Court judgments on socioeconomic rights have brought about positive
change—the “Right to Food” litigation, for instance, provides
midday meals to schoolchildren across India.413
From a broader perspective, taking a social contractarian
view of the Indian Constitution presents an opportunity to rethink our conception of legitimacy. Specifically, in the context
of socioeconomic rights, this view proposes that a legitimate
constitutional system demands not only acceptable institutional arrangements and policy-related outcomes, but also that
public institutions, particularly the Supreme Court, are held to
a strict, process-based standard—they must present clear and
transparent reasons for their decisions that are accessible to all
citizens in light of their common reason.

410. See Baxi, supra note 6, at 107 (“For too long, the apex constitutional
court had become ‘an arena of legal quibbling for men with long purses.’ Now,
increasingly, the Court is being identified by justices as well as people as the
‘last resort for the oppressed and the bewildered.’”).
411. See Nick Robinson, Structure Matters: The Impact of Court Structure
on Indian and U.S. Supreme Courts, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 101, 104–06 (2012)
(noting that the Indian Supreme Court has been dubbed the “people’s court”
and is one of the most accessible—and therefore overloaded—highest courts
in the world).
412. India Ninth-Most Corrupt Country: Survey, ECON. TIMES (Dec. 10,
2010), available at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-1210/news/27614571_1_corrupt-country-transparency-international-pettycorruption (reporting that the Indian public views political parties, the police,
parliament, and civil servants as more corrupt than the judiciary); A. Abdulraheem, Corruption in India: An Overview, 59 SOCIAL ACTION 351 (2009),
available at http://www.isidelhi.org.in/saissues/articles/artoct09.pdf (noting
that a survey conducted by Transparency International reported that 58% of
Indian respondents identified politicians to be the most corrupt state actors,
45% felt that the government was ineffective in addressing corruption in the
country, but only 3% believed the judiciary was corrupt).
413. See A TOOL FOR ACTION, supra note 125, at 15–19.

